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Abstract 
 The common law prohibits the abandonment of real property. Perhaps it is surprising, 
therefore, that the following are true: (1) The common law generally permits the abandonment of 
chattel property; (2) The common law promotes the transfer of real property via adverse 
possession; and (3) the civil law permits the abandonment of real property. Because the 
literature on abandonment is disappointingly sparse, these three contrasts have escaped 
sustained scholarly analysis and criticism. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive analysis 
of the law of abandonment. After engaging in such an analysis, the paper finds that the common 
law’s flat prohibition on the abandonment of corporeal interests in real property is misguided. 
Legal rules prohibiting abandonment ought to be replaced with more a more permissive regime 
where what matters is the value of the underlying resource and the steps that the abandoning 
owner takes to ensure that would-be claimants are alerted to the resource’s availability. 
Furthermore, the law of abandonment ought to be harmonized for real property and chattels. 
Finally, the paper criticizes the law’s preference for adverse possession over abandonment as a 
means of transferring title in cases where the mechanisms might function as substitutes. 
 In the course of analyzing the law of abandonment and offering a qualified defense of the 
practice, the paper provides the first workable definition of resource abandonment, develops a 
taxonomy of existing regimes, suggests that the abandonment of positive-value real and 
intellectual property is surprisingly widespread, and analyzes the costs and benefits associated 
with abandonment. The paper explores at some length the factors that will determine whether an 
owner opts for abandonment or other means for extinguishing his rights to a resource, as well as 
the considerations that should drive the law’s receptivity to these efforts. The latter include the 
decision costs, transaction costs, decay costs, confusion costs, lawless race costs, and 
sustainability issues associated with abandonment. In addition, readers who make it through the 
paper will be exposed to pertinent tidbits concerning the social norms of geocaching, the 
anthropology of “making it rain,” the unfortunate decline of municipal bulky trash pickup, 
Mississippi’s misguided livestock laws, and the dubious parenting choices of Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau.  
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On an ordinary Wednesday in August of 2008, there were 77 separate listings in the 
“Free Stuff” section of Chicago’s Craigslist directory.1 The belongings made freely available 
ranged from items highly desirable (an entertainment center in great condition, a working 
Gilbranson organ, televisions and microwave ovens) to those that might be useful to a niche 
population (a Hewlett Packard inkjet cartridge, VHS tapes of the motion pictures Free Willy and 
Free Willy 2, wooden doors from a colonial house built in 1938) to the nearly worthless (a 
broken refrigerator, one cubic yard of dirt from a landscaping project, “tons of river rocks”). All 
were offered by their owners on a first come, first served basis. In most cases, the items were 
kept inside the owner’s home, and a claimant would need to make arrangements with the owner 
to haul off the property. But the owners would not be picky—the first claimant with the ability to 
do so would be taking the advertised property home. In a few cases, such as the broken 
refrigerator, the item had been left by the owner in an alley or another easily accessible place, 
and the Craigslist advertisement described its location.2 Craigslist is not alone in matching up 
would-be abandoners with potential claimants—another national organizational called 
freecycle.org offers a similar service, with high levels of participation, and bookcrossing.com is 
a global service that facilitates the abandonment and finding of books. In recent years, 
communities of “freegans” have sprouted up in urban areas around the world, eating, cleaning, 
and furnishing their homes exclusively with resources that other people have discarded. As a 
testament to the prevalence of abandonment, it appears that some of these freegans are able to 
live essentially pleasant, middle-class lives.3 What’s more, it is not only personal property that is 
widely abandoned. In rural, depopulated areas of Kansas, Nebraska, and North Dakota, local 
governments have made free land available to anyone who is willing to build a house on it and 
move in.4 And in urban centers, the problem of abandoned dwellings is significant, accounting 
for 23,000 dwelling units in New York City in 1996, and fully 1.3% of all urban residential 
housing units in the Northeastern United States two decades earlier.5  
Given the ubiquity of abandoned property and its presumptive economic importance, one 
would expect there to be a large legal literature exploring the contours of abandonment law. Such 
a supposition is reasonable, though it turns out to be unduly optimistic. There is very little legal 
writing on the abandonment of property. When legal scholars tackle the issue, they tend to focus 
on specific issues, like abandoned shipwreck cases, abandoned oil and gas interests, or 
abandoned rail lines.6 The leading Property casebooks either ignore abandonment entirely or 
                                                            
1 See <http://Chicago.craigslist.org/zip/> (visited Aug. 14, 2008). 
2 See <http://Chicago.craigslist.org/chc/zip/795812089.html> (visited Aug. 14, 2008). 
3 Steven Kurutz, Not Buying It, N.Y. Times, June 21, 2007, at F1. 
4 See, e.g., Laura Bauer, Property Giveaway, Trying to Halt the Population Slide: Towns Tout Free Land to Lure 
New Residents, Kansas City Star, Jan. 29, 2007, at A1; <http://www.kansasfreeland.com/> (visited Aug. 15, 2008). 
5 Benjamin P. Scafidi et al., An Economic Analysis of Housing Abandonment, 7 J. Housing Econ. 287, 288 (1998). 
6 See e.g. David J. Bederman & Brian D. Spielman, Refusing Salvage, 6 Loy. Mar. L.J. 31(2008) ; Ronald W. 
Polston, Mineral ownership theory: Doctrine in Disarray, 70 N.D. L. Rev. 541(1994) ; Michael L. Stokes, Adverse 
Abandonment: Toward Allowing the States to Condemn or Dispose of Unneeded Railway Land, 31 Transp L.J. 69 
(2003). 
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give it brief attention.7 For whatever reason, legal scholars have nearly abandoned the topic and 
remained oblivious to its charms. This paper fills that gap in the property literature by examining 
the law of abandonment in a comprehensive way. Perhaps not surprisingly in light of the dearth 
of attention that abandonment law has received, this paper finds the law of abandonment 
wanting, and suggests doctrinal improvements. 
Part I examines the motivations behind decisions to abandon real and personal property, 
developing a taxonomy of abandonment along the way, and demonstrating through the use of 
examples that positive market value property is abandoned with some frequency. Part I also 
highlights some of the social costs of abandonment, which will form a predicate for laws that 
restrict the practice. The Part concludes by comparing abandonment to the primary competing 
methods of ridding one’s self of property—sales, gifts, and destruction. Part II describes and 
analyzes the law of abandoned property, identifying five basic approaches that courts and 
legislatures have taken and assessing the rationales and merits of these approaches. Part III 
proposes a framework for rationalizing the law of abandonment. In the place of a common law 
regime that prohibits the abandonment of real property and regulates abandonment in the context 
of chattels, the paper suggests a unified regime that is pegged to the underlying market value of 
the resource and the social costs of abandonment. More precisely, the law likely ought to permit 
the abandonment of positive market value resources if owners take steps to advertise the 
availability of such property. Such advertisement will minimize most of the social costs 
associated with abandonment. In the context of negative market-value resources, a prohibition on 
abandonment usually makes sense in both the real property and chattel property contexts, at least 
in nations where the baseline level of law abiding behavior is high. In short, this Paper presents a 
qualified defense of the right to abandon property.  
I. Understanding Abandonment 
It will be helpful to begin with a definition. In the case of abandonment, a simple and 
elegant definition is readily available. Abandonment means any unilateral transfer of ownership. 
The word “unilateral” is doing much of the heavy lifting here.8 Other means of transferring 
                                                            
7 See, e.g., BARLOW BURKE ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PROPERTY LAW 18-24 (2d Ed. 2004) (including Eads v. 
Brazelton, a case involving an abandoned shipwreck and Haslem v. Lockwood, involving abandoned manure); JOHN 
E. CRIBBET ET AL., PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 109-113 (9th ed. 2008) (providing, in 4 pages, the most 
detailed treatment of the subject among leading casebooks, focusing mostly on the abandonment of chattels and 
including Eads); JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 793-96 (6th ed. 2006) (including the Pocono Springs case 
concerning the abandonment of land and focusing on affirmative covenants’ relationship to the abandonment of real 
property); JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE (1998) (ignoring the abandonment of real property outside of the landlord-tenant context); PAUL 
GOLDSTEIN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., PROPERTY LAW: OWNERSHIP, USE, AND CONSERVATION (2006) (ignoring 
the issue of abandonment); THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 518-
523 (2007) (focusing on the abandonment of real property, and including the Pocono Springs case); JOSEPH SINGER, 
PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 92-96 (2006) (including Charrier v. Bell, a case involving the 
legal treatment of buried Native American artifacts). 
8 The clearest articulation of this point in the case law is found in Bright v. Gineste, 284 P.2d 839, 842 (Cal. App. 
1955) (“[T]o constitute an abandonment in the strict legal sense there must be a parting with title that is unilateral, 
the owner must leave the property free to the acquisition of whoever wishes to claim it, and indifferent as to what 
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property—sales, gifts, bequests, releases, forfeitures, foreclosures, and adverse possession—
require that a third party assume ownership of the property or agree to do so. An owner who 
wishes to dispose of property unilaterally has just two options: abandonment and destruction.9 
Logically, then, abandonment can be defined with reference to what it is not: It is a unilateral, 
non-destructive means of ridding one’s self of ownership. The destruction of a resource is not a 
transfer, because there is no transferee.  
Why would someone abandon property? This question lies at the core of any serious 
inquiry into this body of law. As discussed below, there may be a number of reasons why an 
owner might regard abandonment as an attractive strategy for transferring property. The most 
significant advantages of abandonment are that it allows an owner to avoid the transaction costs 
associated with a consensual transfer and the decision costs associated with determining the 
identity of the most appropriate transferee. Other reasons why abandonment might prove 
attractive include altruistic or reciprocal motivations, a desire to sell ancillary goods, and efforts 
to enhance one’s reputation or derive entertainment value.10 The paragraphs that follow describe 
some of the more common forms of property abandonment. 
A. Taxonomy of Abandoned Properties 
It is widely assumed that property is only abandoned when it becomes worthless or when 
the transaction costs of transferring the property exceed its market value. For example, Tom 
Merrill and Henry Smith identify the core condition that leads to abandonment as an asset 
possessing negative value.11 They then ask whether there would ever be a context in which 
owners abandon property that does not have negative value. Although they do not respond to this 
question, it has an affirmative answer. The case law reflects numerous instances in which 
property with positive market value is abandoned, and contemporary experience, summarized 
below, suggests that this behavior remains common. By exploring the different types of non-
negative value properties that are nevertheless abandoned, we will make headway toward 
determining precisely what the law of abandonment ought to say.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
may become of it. A transfer of property from one person to another cannot be effected by abandonment, and 
abandonment cannot be made to a particular individual.”). 
9 A zero-price sale is not abandonment under this definition. A zero-price sale of a resource requires that a purchaser 
agree to take possession of the item before title is transferred. With abandonment, title is relinquished at the moment 
the prior possessor relinquishes control, regardless of the actions of any would-be recipient. 
10 These are the private benefits of abandonment, and such private benefits will enhance social welfare. In isolated 
cases, there may be disconnected social benefits from abandonment. For example, abandonment might signal a shift 
in underlying property values that helps transition land to its most appropriate use, which in some cases may be a 
commons. See Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. Legal Stud. 421, 425 
(2002). 
11 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 7, at 522; cf. Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 173, 190 (1987) (noting that a trustee’s “abandonment power exists because some kinds of property are not 
worth keeping”). 
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We can describe property, be it real, chattel, or intellectual, using a four box matrix. The 
two relevant variables are value to the existing owner (subjective value) and market value.12  
 
Positive Subjective Value, Positive Market 
Value 
Medium-low abandonment frequency 
(Examples: geocaching, major league 
baseballs, Making it Rain) 
Positive Subjective Value, Negative Market 
Value 
Very low abandonment frequency 
(Examples: Tyrannical Heirlooms) 
Negative Subjective Value, Positive Market 
Value 
Medium-high Abandonment Frequency 
(Examples: Property associated with ex-lovers, 
cultural objects predating owners’ taste 
changes, some pets) 
Negative Subjective Value, Negative Market 
Value 
Very High Abandonment Frequency 
(Examples: Refuse, contaminated land, badly 
damaged chattels) 
 
Property that is devoid of both subjective value and market value is likely to be abandoned 
unless the law forbids it. In the overwhelming majority of forfeiture cases involving New York 
City real estate, the property in question had liens that exceeded the market value of the 
underlying property at the time of its seizure by the government to pay off tax liens, and it seems 
plausible that most abandoned real estate has this characteristic as well.13 Nobody wants this 
property in its present form, and the cost of paying off tax liens exceeds the market value that it 
would have if repaired or brought free and clear.  In some contexts, such as the environmental 
contamination setting, the law must impose the clean-up costs on someone—either the owner of 
the negative value asset, the polluter, the neighbors who are suffering from the pollution, or the 
taxpayers.14 Speaking more generally, an asset that has no economic value to anyone should be 
repaired, recycled, unbundled, or destroyed.15  
Repairing, recycling, unbundling, and destruction are of course not costless.  Hence the 
law will limit an individual owner’s ability to impose such costs on the public at large. The 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)16 
provides a statutory framework for imposing environmental remediation costs on the owners of 
                                                            
12 The divergence between subjective value and market value is a well-established trope in the academic literature 
on the law of takings and the question of just compensation. See, e.g., Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: 
Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings, 99 Nw U. L. Rev. 677 (2005); Lee Anne Fennell, Taking 
Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 957, 962-65 (2004). 
13 Scafidi et al., supra note 5, at 293, 297. Although they refer to these units as “abandoned” property, most of the 
units described in their paper are more accurately characterized for our purposes as foreclosed. Id. At no point is the 
real property placed up for grabs to a finder, as is the case with legally abandoned property. See supra note 8. 
14 The law typically imposes these costs on the polluter if it can collect from him. See Baird, supra note 11, at 187-
91. 
15 See infra section I.C. 
16 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. 
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negative value property. Various laws at the state and local level prohibit the non-consensual 
dumping of waste on public and private property.17 Municipalities may provide public trashcans 
in parks or on city streets, and people wishing to rid themselves of negative value assets will try 
to abandon them there, but it is not irrational for the government to take on the costs of 
destruction or recycling in this case. The city might rationally conclude that in the absence of 
these trash receptacles, people will abandon their property in the parks or streets themselves, 
creating unsightly litter and public health hazards. Note, however, that cities cap the costs 
associated with the intake of abandoned property by prohibiting the dumping of household waste 
in public trash cans18 and limiting their size. It is quite rare to find public dumpsters in urban 
parks or near sidewalks, in part because their presence will invite individuals to dispose of large 
negative value assets therein. As a general matter, individuals and firms have to arrange with 
private entities or public sanitation departments to lose possession of negative market value 
property. Once such a contract is entered into or tax revenue is dedicated to this purpose, it is no 
longer appropriate to describe the waste in question as having been abandoned. Rather, it is 
consensually transferred by one party to another for the purposes of disposal.  
A second category of property that is regularly abandoned has negative subjective value 
and positive market value. Property that is associated with an ex-lover is often abandoned by an 
owner despite its positive market value. A popular press how-to book that instructs readers on 
making money by purchasing abandoned properties suggests that divorce frequently causes both 
former spouses to abandon the family home, and that people who inherit properties where a 
loved one died sometimes abandon the land so as to avoid dealing with painful memories.19 
More trivially, an adult may decide that the objects associated with her youth do not belong in 
her residence any longer, but would surely make some child happy, so she may leave them in a 
publicly accessible place for the first interested passer by.  
A third category of property, entailing positive subjective value and low market value, is 
extremely unlikely to be abandoned. In these cases a transfer of the resource in question makes 
society worse off. Indeed, in these cases abandonment will almost invariably result from 
imperfect information. Either the owner underestimates her own attachment to the property or 
the owner overestimates its market value and mistakenly believes herself to be abandoning a 
                                                            
17 See, e.g., Alaska Stat. Ann. § 46.06.080 (fines maximized at $1000); Cal. Penal Code § 374.3 (West 2008) 
(separates personal dumping from commercial dumping, fines up to $6000 for commercial dumping); Tex. Health & 
Safety § 365.012 (creates a carefully graded punishment regime dependent on the amount of waste dumped). 
18 Several years ago a Washington, D.C. lawyer threw away a FedEx mailing slip providing his residential address in 
a public trashcan and was fined $35 for violating the District’s prohibition. Marc Fischer, When It Comes to Waste, 
D.C. Is Priceless, Wash. Post., May 24, 2004, at B1. 
19 CHANTAL HOWELL CAREY & BILL CAREY, MAKE MONEY IN ABANDONED PROPERTIES: HOW TO IDENTIFY AND 
BUY VACANT PROPERTIES AND MAKE A HUGE PROFIT 15 (2006). Much of the Careys’ advice seems as dubious as 
the title of their book. They state that they have purchased multiple high value properties that were in the process of 
being abandoned by their owners, but provide no documentation. See id. at 7-15. Their account should be taken with 
a fistful of salt. Having said that, scenarios like the ones described by the Careys are reflected in the case law. See, 
e.g., Yourik v. Mallonee, 921 A.2d 869, 871-72 & n. 1 (Md. App. 2007); Mickens v. Mickens, 385 P.2d 14, 16 
(Wash. 1963). 
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positive subject value, positive market value resource. Examples of this category are somewhat 
difficult to imagine, but perhaps they might include “tyrannical heirlooms.” Quintessential 
tyrannical heirlooms are property that an individual received from a relative that were valued by 
the donor but detested by the recipient. Nevertheless, the recipients felt duty bound to keep and 
maintain the heirloom in question, out of affection for the donor.20 The presence of such a 
relationship makes it far more likely that we will see this sort of transfer in the testamentary 
context than anywhere else, because the recipient has no opportunity to express dissatisfaction 
with the bequest to the decedent. Such transfers will not occur via sales because no one will step 
forward to purchase the items. They will occur via inter vivos gifts only occasionally. The law of 
gifts requires acceptance as an element, but the recipient may accept an item she does not truly 
want out of a desire to avoid hurting the donor’s feelings.21 It is hard to imagine abandonment as 
a domain for such transfers because (1) people will be reluctant to abandon property they value 
to total strangers; (2) total strangers who do not want such property will be reluctant to take 
possession of it; and (3) there is little reason to think that the finder of such undesirable property 
will feel any sense of kinship with the abandoner, such that he would willingly take possession. 
On reflection, then, if they occur at all these sorts of transfers are surely quite rare.  
As a perusal of Craigslist will attest, positive market value assets are abandoned with 
some regularity. These are the most interesting abandonment cases, and they will get the fullest 
treatment here. For starters, take baseballs hit into the stands at major league ballgames. Thanks 
to Popov v. Hayashi, the Barry Bonds home run ball controversy, we now have clear case law 
holding that a baseball is the property of major league baseball at the time the pitcher throws it, 
but that it becomes abandoned property the moment it flies off a hitter’s bat and out of play.22 
Some of these baseballs have significant monetary value. For example, Mark McGwire’s 70th 
home run ball sold for $3 million, the ball at issue in Popov sold for $450,000, and the foul 
baseball that Cubs fan Steve Bartman deflected into the stands in the 2003 National League 
Championship series fetched more than $113,000 at auction. We might therefore wonder why 
Major League Baseball does not retain title to balls hit into the stands, as the National Basketball 
Association and National Football League evidently do. The answer is straightforward—the 
league seems to have concluded that the opportunity to capture abandoned baseball at ballparks 
induces fans to attend games. Thus, by abandoning valuable property, but limiting the potential 
claimants of that property almost entirely to paying fans,23 major league baseball plausibly 
maximizes its own profits. Major league baseball is not the only entity to recognize that 
abandonment might lend itself to profit-maximization by opening up ancillary revenue streams. 
                                                            
20 Joyce Wadler, The Tyranny of the Heirloom, N.Y. Times, June 26, 2008.  
21 This sentiment accurately describes the attitude of the author and his spouse toward a fantastically unattractive 
wedding gift received from a distant relative. 
22 Popov v. Hayashi, No. 400545, 2002 WL 31833731, at *3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002). 
23 The modifier is included because at some ballparks, such as Chicago’s Wrigley Field or San Francisco’s AT & T 
Park, home run balls are hit out of the stadium with some regularity, landing on public streets outside Wrigley or 
public waterways outside AT & T Park.  
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One clever Craigslist poster offered a free HDTV that was in need of expensive repairs, and 
noted, “As an added bonus, you can buy the [TV] stand for 50 bucks!”24  
Now for some less straightforward cases. Devon, England, has been celebrating the Hot 
Pennies Ceremony for more than 750 years. During the ceremony, town residents in the 
buildings throw buckets of coins into the streets, where they are scooped up by the crowds 
below.25 Although the ceremony has now become a successful tourist attraction—consistent with 
the major league baseball explanation of abandoned baseballs—its origins were rather different. 
By town lore, the items tossed into the streets were initially coins that had been heated to high 
temperatures “so that rich people could amuse themselves by witnessing poor people burning 
themselves.”26 In an updated echo of this ancient ceremony, athletes, musicians, models, and 
other public figures have gained notoriety by tossing large denomination bills into the air in 
public places. In hip-hop culture the practice has been referred to as “making it rain,” and media 
accounts have popped up around the globe describing the practice, with one sports columnist 
referring to it as a “tradition” among athletes.27 Boxing champion Floyd Mayweather, Jr. has 
become famous for the practice of tossing stacks containing $10,000 in hundred dollar bills into 
their air so that he can watch fans scramble for them.28 So too football player Pacman Jones, who 
was arrested after allegedly sending tens of thousands of dollars airborne at a Las Vegas strip 
club, sparking a violent melee.29 In homage to Jones, Comedian George Lopez tosses $1000 in 
$20 dollar bills into the crowd at a golf tournament each year.30 Even purportedly cash-strapped 
collegiate athletes have gotten into the act, triggering brawls at nightclubs.31 Making it rain has 
even worked down-market, with models from the clothing line Shmack getting press coverage 
for tossing 400 one dollar bills into a crowd after a fashion show,32 around the same time that an 
unidentified Albany basketball fan threw 50 one dollar bills into the crowd at a high school 
basketball game, causing a disturbance that forced the game’s cancellation.33 The practice of 
                                                            
24 See <http://Chicago.craigslist.org/nwc/zip/795820052.html> (visited Aug. 14, 2008). 
25 Bradley Gerrard, Town Cashes in as Hot Pennies Rain Down on a Money-Mad Crowd, EE, July 23, 2008, at 3, 
available in 2008 WL 13754625.  
26 Id. In America in the 1960s, something similar happened to the father of vice presidential nominee Joe Biden, 
causing him to quit a job. See David Brooks, Hoping Its Biden, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 2008, at A21. (“Once, when 
Joe Sr. was working for a car dealership, the owner threw a Christmas party for the staff. Just as dancing was to 
being, the owner scattered silver dollars on the floor and watched from above as the mechanics and salesmen 
scrambled about for them. Joe Sr. quit that job on the spot.”). 
27 Tom Knott, Blath Following Pro Athlete Tradition, Wash. Times, June 6, 2008, at C1. 
28 Norm Clark, Waxworks Visitors Casts Vote Early, Las Vegas Rev. J., Nov. 12, 2006, at 4A, available in 2006 WL 
19743500; Paul Hayward, A Fight for Survival?, Daily Mail, June 23, 2007, at 115, available in 2007 WLNR 
11869796. 
29 Greg Moore, The Mash-Up: Live in a Fantasy This Week in Video Games, This Week in Sports, Pop Culture 
Mash-ups, K.C. Star, Feb. 25, 2007, at C15. There is some dispute as to whether Jones was throwing the money at 
exotic dancers, abandoning it generally, or just tossing it in the air with the hopes of reclaiming it. He was arrested 
after allegedly striking a dancer who was grabbing some of the bills. 
30 Scott Ostler, Lopez Says No Feud with Murray – Seriously, S.F. Chron., Feb. 6, 2008, at D1. 
31 Dick Weiss, 2 Tales Make for Great Final Four, N.Y. Daily News, April 6, 2008, at 47. 
32 Malcolm Venable, The Beautiful People Overheard, Virginian Pilot & Ledger-Star, Dec. 2, 2007, at 12, available 
in 2007 WLNR 23785053. 
33 James Allen, Thrown Bills Lead to Ruckus at Game, Albany Times Union, Dec. 8, 2007, at C1. 
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abandoning specie is, in short, a strategy for accomplishing any number of rational objectives: 
garnering attention, signaling wealth, or being entertained (for people with perverse 
entertainment preferences).  
In the last few years, however, the abandonment of positive-value property has become 
mainstream and organized by a group far removed from the hip-hop set, thanks to an emerging 
outdoor activity called geocaching. Geocaching was invented by David Ulmer in 2000. Shortly 
after highly precise GPS receivers were first made available to ordinary consumers, Ulmer “hid a 
treasure near his home, posted the coordinates on the web, and challenged people to find it.”34 
Other owners of GPS receivers soon followed suit, hiding their own treasures in waterproof 
containers, and posting their coordinates on www.geocaching.com, a web site that contained 
625,132 active caches as of August 1, 2008. There are active geocaches in more than 100 
countries and on every continent.35 Caches typically include inexpensive items, like coins, 
carnival prizes, Match Box cars, or rubber erasers, and the expectation is that each geocacher 
who finds the cache will take the contents and leave another cache in the same place for the next 
geocacher to find.36 Individuals setting up geocaches sometimes spend substantially more on the 
contents of a cache, however. Music CDs, concert and sporting event tickets, books, and costume 
jewelry are commonly left in caches.37 Some geocachers leave a webcam at the specified 
location, permitting the person who finds it to pose for a picture that can then be sent to the 
person who hid the webcam.38 Experienced geocachers will often carry a few luxury items with 
them, so that they can leave an equal or higher value item for the next geocacher if they do 
discover a high-value cache.39 Whenever a high value item is left in the cache, whether it is 
something like a web cam that is not meant to be taken away, or a cache that is intended to be 
carried off by a finder, the creator of the cache runs a real risk that the property will be taken by 
someone who leaves nothing behind—or plundered, to use the term that geocachers prefer. 
When this happens, a disappointed geocacher typically notes on a geocaching web site that the 
cache needs maintenance, and the person who established it typically will restock it.40  
Despite the common adherence to the norm dictating that someone who finds a geocache 
should leave a trinket of equal or greater value behind for the next geocacher, there is evidently 
no legal requirement that this be done. As a formal matter, a geocache left on public land is 
abandoned property, and the first person who finds it is entitled to take the entirety of the cache. 
This raises the question of why geocaching has thrived, and why individuals spend time and 
money establishing caches to begin with. In a survey of geocaching participants, Chavez, 
                                                            
34 Barbara Elwood Schlatter & Amy R. Hurd, Geocaching: 21st-Century Hide-and-Seek, 76 J. Phys. Ed., Recreation 
& Dance 28 (2005). 
35 Deborah J. Chavez, Ingrid Schneider & Todd Powell, The Social Psychology of a Technology-Driven Outdoor 
Trend: Geocaching in the USA 1 (unpublished manuscript on file with author).  
36 Schlatter & Hurd, supra note 34, at 29. 
37 Chavez et al., supra note 35, at 3. 
38 Id. at 30. 
39 See < http://cacheopedia.com/wiki/Trade_items> (visited Aug. 1, 2008). 
40 Id. 
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Schneider and Powell found that a narrow majority of geocachers had never set up a geocache of 
their own. More than a third had created one to five geocaches, and a little more than five percent 
had set up more than ten geocaches.41 It appears that a desire to gain reputational benefits drives 
relatively little of the geocaching behavior. When the researchers asked geocachers about the 
benefits of the activity, the desire to meet others was identified as the least important motivation 
for their participation.42 Geocachers do go on treasure hunts with family and friends, frequently, 
however, which suggests that that there is a social dimension to looking for treasure,43 but the 
reasons why individuals leave caches evidently have more to do with general altruism and a 
sense of ethical reciprocity than a desire to enhance one’s reputation among strangers.44 
Surveying the identified categories of abandoned property that has positive perceived 
value to the abandoner, we can identify three distinct types of motivations for abandonment. 
First, the owner may abandon property for profit-maximizing purposes, seeking to acquire 
revenue streams for services that those seeking to claim the abandoned property will need to 
purchase. It is conceivable that a GPS-manufacturer like Garmin could pursue a similar strategy 
with respect to geocaching by seeding geocaches all over the country as an inducement to 
purchase their products. To my disappointment, I have been unable to turn up any evidence that 
Garmin has pursued this strategy.45 Second, the owner may abandon property for reputation-
enhancing purposes. Third, the owner may abandon property for more altruistic reasons, which 
may have some connection to entertainment value (as in “making it rain”) or norms of 
reciprocity (as in geocaching). 
More broadly, abandonment may provide an attractive alternative to other means of 
ridding one’s self of positive-value property. Abandonment is advantageous because it enables 
an owner to rid herself of property while incurring neither the transaction costs of a bilateral 
transfer nor the decision costs associated with a gift.46 In that sense, abandonment represents 
another property right designed to expand the owner’s freedom of action. This brings to mind 
                                                            
41 Chavez et al., supra note 35, at 7 tbl. 3, 
42 Id. at 10. 
43 Id. at 8-10. 
44 There are some parallels between geocaching and dedications of valuable copyrighted works to the public domain. 
On the latter, see, e.g., Severine Dussolier, The Master’s Tools v. The Master’s House: Creative Commons v. 
Copyright, 29 Colum. J. L. & Arts. 271, 274 & n.9 (2006), and sources cited infra note 125. In both cases the 
valuable resources is being left up for public use, but in the former case the prior owner’s expectation is that the 
resource will become another’s private property, whereas in the latter case no individual will be entitled to establish 
private property rights in the work. In recent years organizations like Creative Commons have arisen to facilitate the 
dedication of copyrighted works to the public domain. See, e.g. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/publicdomain/ 
(visited Jan. 27, 2009) (providing language for a public domain license). The model licenses even Creative 
Commons features most prominently on its web sites, however, fall short of a public domain dedication, and provide 
for restrictions requiring users to provide attribution to the creator, limiting commercial use of the work, or limiting 
the right to create derivative works. See <http://creativecommons.org/about/licenses/> (visited Jan. 27, 2009). Many 
authors dedicating work to the public domain understandably would bristle at the idea that another person might take 
credit for creating the work in question or profit by distributing the dedicated work or derivate works.   
45 Perhaps deep-pocketed Garmin is concerned that seeding a number of caches might expose the company to 
liability if geocachers are injured or trespass while searching for the treasure. 
46 See infra text accompanying notes 64-110. 
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J.E. Penner’s justification for abandonment, which is rooted in an individual autonomy interest: 
“One ought not to be saddled with a relationship to a thing that one does not want, and an 
unbreakable relation to a thing would condemn the owner to having to deal with it. It would 
indeed be a funny turn of events if . . . property in essence gave the things a person owned a 
power over him.”47 On Penner’s account, there is a symmetry between a system of laws that 
gives an individual the freedom to choose whether and when to acquire, and whether and when 
to be rid of, property.48  
Penner’s discussion of the relationship between abandonment and autonomy is insightful 
but he pulls one important punch. It is precisely the unilateral nature of abandonment that makes 
it and the right to destroy the most powerful manifestations of an individual’s autonomy interest 
in the bundle of property rights.49 By letting an individual abandon property, the state is saying to 
the owner, essentially, “we will allow you to rid yourself of a resource regardless of what anyone 
else has to say about the matter.” As with its cousin, the right to destroy, this unilateral 
empowerment of the abandoning owner raises the prospect of disempowerment of everybody 
else. Penner sensibly recognizes that there are autonomy interests on both sides of the 
abandonment calculus: 
While the interest underpinning property incorporates the interest in getting rid of 
things one no longer wants, people also have an interest in not being harmed by 
the way people deal with their things. This is both an interest that all individuals 
have, and a social interest, in that the maintenance of the environment is a 
collective good. The rules of title, specifically the rule that one’s title is not 
extinguished unless another takes possession and acquires his own title, either 
gratuitously or for a fee, provide a means of ascribing responsibility to a person 
for the harms which his property may cause, even though he might wish to sever 
his relation to it. . . . [B]y relinquishing possession, he may not avoid 
responsibility for the effects of his ownership, say the creation of hazardous 
industrial wastes.50 
Some acts of abandonment may have the effect of saddling third parties with property that they 
do not want. The next section considers this and other potential problems with permitting 
abandonment. 
                                                            
47 J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 79 (1997). 
48 Property typically does not find its way into an owner’s hands by accident. Rather, the owner’s earlier decisions to 
purchase, produce, or take possession of property result in its acquisition. Penner’s autonomy interest might then 
appropriately be cast as a measure to protect the autonomy of individuals against the economic consequences of 
decisions made by their earlier selves. See generally DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984) (exploring the 
implications of such a philosophical framework). In that sense, the abandonment of negative-value property is a 
kindred spirit to bankruptcy or some information privacy protections. 
49 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 Yale L.J. 781, 794-95 (2005) (discussing the right to 
destroy’s importance as the most extreme right in the property bundle). 
50 Id. at 79-80. 
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B. Costs of Abandonment 
Having considered the types of properties that are commonly abandoned and the benefits 
that flow to their abandoners, it is worth assessing the costs that abandonment imposes on 
society. Although signaling, reciprocity, and altruism may explain some abandonment of positive 
market value properties, the primary benefits associated with abandonment are reduced 
transaction costs and decision costs. Similarly, there are two leading problems associated with 
abandonment. First, abandonment may create confusion as to the state of ownership of property. 
Second, abandonment may result in the deterioration of an asset’s value while it remains 
unowned. In some cases involving worthless property, abandonment may externalize disposal 
costs onto society. In other cases involving valuable property, abandonment may spark violent 
squabbling among would-be claimants.  
Let us consider the confusion problem first. The legal treatment of abandoned property 
differs from lost or mislaid property. Abandoned property belongs to the first person to find it 
and take possession.51 The finder of lost property typically prevails over anyone other than the 
true owner or a prior possessor.52 Finally, mislaid property typically goes to the landowner on 
whose property the item in question was found for safekeeping.53 When an individual stumbles 
upon chattel property, it can be difficult to discern whether it is abandoned, lost, or mislaid, and 
thus difficult for the finder to determine his rights and responsibilities.  
Similarly, there are a number of noteworthy property cases in which courts had to 
confront substantial ambiguity over whether a resource owner abandoned personal property or 
incorporeal interests in real property. In Eads v. Brazelton,54 the court struggled with the 
question of whether title to a shipwreck on the Mississippi River had been abandoned or retained 
by its owner. In Haslem v. Lockwood,55 the court flailed in its discussion of whether piles of 
manure left overnight had been abandoned. In the macabre case of Hays v. Montague,56 the court 
had to decide whether the rifle that James Earl Ray left at the crime scene after murdering Martin 
Luther King had been abandoned. In Hawkins v. Mahoney,57 the majority and dissent sharply 
disagreed over whether personal property left in a jail cell by an escaped inmate had been 
abandoned. And in Strong v. Detroit & Mackinac Railway Company,58 the court held that a 
railway’s explicit reference to its own “abandoned” railway line in a public document did not 
amount to abandonment of its incorporeal interest in the property. The lesson here is that 
abandonment causes confusion, and confusion engenders social costs—it may spark controversy, 
moral qualms, and unnecessary investments in determining the status of property. Ex ante, 
confusion may deter finders from claiming valuable property that they discover, resulting in 
                                                            
51 Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *3. 
52 See, e.g., Armory v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B.1722); Ganter v. Kapiloff, 69 Md.App. 97, 103 (1986). 
53 McAvoy v. Medina, 11 Allen 548, 549 (Mass. 1866). 
54 22 Ark. 499 (1861). 
55 37 Conn. 500 (1871). 
56 860 S.W.2d 403 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) 
57 990 P.2d 776 (Mont. 1999). 
58 423 N.W.2d 266, 269 (Mich. App. 1988). 
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welfare losses. As this analysis indicates, one goal of abandonment law should be to reduce the 
associated confusion costs. We will take up this issue in Part III. 
The deterioration problem is also nearly universal in cases of abandonment. To the extent 
that property forms a portion of a jurisdiction’s tax base, abandonment may result in an 
ownership lag whereas gifts, sales, and bequests do not. The lag also means that a productive 
societal asset generates no value for a period of time. This lag is particularly troublesome in the 
case of an asset whose quality or value will decline the longer it remains unpossessed by an 
owner. The classic example would be abandoned homes, which may experience burst pipes, 
vandalism, vermin infestations, fixture stripping by scavengers, icy sidewalks, or become dens of 
criminality if they remain unoccupied for a significant period of time.59 Once again, with most 
abandoned assets, the goal of law should be to reduce the time during which property remains up 
for grabs. We shall consider this interest in Part III as well.  
Two mutually exclusive costs of abandonment are disposal costs (in the case of negative 
market value property) and lawless race costs (in the case of positive market value property). The 
former are best exemplified in the context of environmentally contaminated real property, where 
CERCLA tries to impose cleanup costs on owners who try to abandon their land. Examples of 
the latter include the Popov v. Hayashi and Pacman Jones disputes referenced earlier. If 
particularly valuable property is to be abandoned, one can expect that many claimants will invest 
in capturing it, and those who seek to do so may try to obtain some advantage over their 
competitors by engaging in violent or other unlawful acts.60 That said, lawless races may 
engender harms even if there is no outbreak of violence. Many communities throughout 
California had to cancel “bulky trash day,” when homeowners were permitted to abandon large 
items at curbside because scavengers inevitably rummaged through abandoned property before 
government and non-profit-affiliated salvagers arrived, made off with the valuable items, and 
increased the costs of sorting through and collecting what remained.61 Finally, as discussed 
                                                            
59 See Briglia v. Modrian Mortgage Co., 698 A.2d 28, 30-31 (N.J. Super. 1997); Scafidi et al., supra note 5, at 288; 
Note, A Nuisance Law Approach to the Problem of Housing Abandonment, 85 Yale L.J. 1130, 1132-33 (1967). 
Note, however, that all of those problems have been documented in the foreclosure context, where a home is not 
abandoned, but is in the process of being transferred by a mortgagor to a mortgagee. Even if a homeowner 
undergoing foreclosure is occupying the premises, his incentive to maintain them appropriately will be substantially 
diminished because of the risk that the benefits of that maintenance will be captured by the bank. 
60 See Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *6; infra text accompanying note 29. In the Popov case, where the baseball in 
question was valuable enough to be claimed by someone in short order, and it was likely going to be found in a 
located in a finite space, there was no need to have 20,000 fans in position to track down the ball. This may infer 
inefficiently high levels of entry into the race. A few dozen spectators could have covered the outfield bleachers and 
McCovey Cove adequately while still ensuring that the ball in question would be located. (This sets aside the 
considerable entertainment value associated with having a chance to take possession of the ball.) In the case of other 
valuable abandoned property whose location is harder to pinpoint, such as most ancient shipwrecks, we can be less 
certain about the optimal number of finders.  
61 Kara Platoni, What’s Killing Bulky Trash Day? The Popular Neighborhood Event – Lifeblood of Nonprofits, 
Artists, and Scavengers Is on Its Way to the Rubbish Heap, East Bay Express, June 30, 2004. Platoni describes these 
lawless race costs in detail: 
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elsewhere in this paper, permitting abandonment may encourage non-sustainable uses of a 
resource,62 and may prompt welfare losses if an owner erroneously overestimates demand for 
property he is considering abandoning.63   
C.  Abandonment’s Comparative Appeal 
Although “unilateral transfer of property” provides a straightforward conceptual 
description of abandonment, such a definition provides little help to a court that must determine 
whether a particular set of actions and circumstances amount to a transfer. The common law 
requires that the party seeking to demonstrate abandonment of property establish two elements. 
First, the owner must have intended to relinquish all interests in the property, with no intention 
that it be acquired by any particular person. Second, there must be a voluntary act by the owner 
effectuating that intent.64 If property is abandoned, then it belongs to the first person who 
subsequently takes control over it.65 Although it need not be part of the definition, the use of a 
public or communal space to effectuate a transfer is often a hallmark of abandonment.66 Notably, 
the abandoner can reclaim possession of the abandoned property if he does so before any other 
person appropriates it.67  
Although it is the second element that often looms large in abandonment litigation, the 
first is worth emphasizing for analytical purposes. True abandonment entails an individual 
relinquishing property to no one in particular.68  Abandonment thus provides a property owner 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
When residents leave out donations in opaque garbage bags, the scavengers will rip them open to 
see what's inside and toss the contents everywhere. And Ryan gets stuck with the cleanup. The 
scavengers, he says, "take most of the good stuff and leave a big old mess." 
This, it turns out, is the main reason local governments no longer love bulky trash day, 
and why so many have decided to get rid of it. In past years, most cities in Alameda County cities 
hosted these neighborhood spring cleanings, and several had programs like Ryan's that gave the 
nonprofits first dibs. Now Ryan's Contra Costa reuse program is the last of its kind in the East 
Bay, and Orinda is one of just a handful of local cities that still does neighborhood-wide pickups. 
The pro scavengers simply got so good at the game that they would routinely beat the nonprofits 
to the punch. Sanitation workers, meanwhile, were tired of dealing with the mess, and 
homeowners were getting creeped out by the strangers sifting through their belongings. 
So this spring, Berkeley, Oakland, El Cerrito, and Livermore all quietly nixed their bulky 
trash days in favor of appointment-only systems in which residents must call the city for a pickup. 
Alameda, Hayward, San Leandro, and Richmond already made this switch in recent years. The 
cities hope that the scavengers, no longer knowing when and where lucrative piles will appear, 
will simply give up. 
Id. 
62 See infra text accompanying notes 137-140. 
63 See supra text accompanying note 20. 
64 See, e.g., Campbell v. Cochran, 416 A.2d 211, 221 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1980); Griffis v. Davidson County Metro. Govt., 
164 S.W.3d 267 (Tenn. 2005). 
65 Haslem v. Lockwood, 37 Conn. 500 (1871). 
66 At least one court has imposed a public place test as part of its definition of property abandonment for the 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Reed, 641 S.E.2d 320, 323 (N.C. App. 2007). 
67 Hawkins v. Mahoney, 990 P.2d 776, 779 (Mont. 1999) (quoting 1 C.J.S. Abandonment § 12 (1985)). 
68 See, e.g., Martin v. Cassidy, 307 P.2d 981, 984 (Cal. App. 1957) (holding that the abandoning owner must be 
“entirely indifferent as to what may become of [the property] or as to who may thereafter possess it”); Miller v. 
Dallas County, 158 S.W.2d 828, 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (Bond, C.J., dissenting) (“Abandonment, accordingly, is 
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with a low-cost way to “roll the dice” as to the identity of the subsequent owner, and in this way 
it differs from virtually all other forms of uncompensated relinquishment, where the subsequent 
taker or class of takers will be identified with particularity.69 This “roll of the dice” element is 
important, because it means that a great deal of what is commonly called “abandonment” in the 
law actually is better deemed forfeiture.70 For example, when the record owner of a property 
with tax liens that exceed its market value “abandons” the property, he is not placing the 
resource up for grabs.71 Rather, he is enabling another party that already holds an interest in the 
property to take possession of it. The forfeiting owner’s fractional ownership interest has seen its 
value lowered to zero, but the resource as a whole likely retains positive value. The transfer is 
not unilateral, but rather a voluntary transfer from one record owner to another specifically 
contemplated at the time the relevant property interests were created.72 Similarly, when the 
beneficiary of an easement releases it, this is not abandonment because the transfer necessarily 
benefits the owner of the servient tenement. “Abandonment” as used in the Bankruptcy Code 
likewise does not count as abandonment for our purposes because the trustee necessarily 
abandons property “to the debtor” or another party with an interest in the property.73  
Insofar as it necessarily entails a roll of the dice, abandonment has something in common 
with most sales. A generally underappreciated attribute of an auction or other sale is that the 
seller typically rolls the dice as to the identity of the subsequent owner. Sellers are usually 
indifferent to the identities of subsequent owners because that indifference is likely to maximize 
the sale price.74 With abandonment, randomization must serve some different purpose. At first 
glance, the randomization that abandonment entails seems to undermine distributive justice. But 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
the relinquishment of a right, a total desertion, the giving up to no one in particular of something to which one is 
entitled.”), majority op. rev’d by 166 S.W.2d 922 (1942); see also Cutone v. Cutone, 285 S.E.2d 905 (W.V. 1982) 
(holding that a widow does not abandon her right to quarantine – the right to occupy the family residence during the 
period between a husband’s death and the assignment of dower – unless she “has demonstrated an apparent 
indifference to what would become of the property”).  
69 It is possible to design a future interest in property in such a way as to approximate abandonment. For example, “I 
leave my Rolex watch to the first person who stumbles upon it after it is deposited by my executor in a hidden 
location in Central Park in January of 2009.” 
70 See Bright v. Gineste, 284 P.2d 839, 842-43 (Cal. App. 1955). 
71 See supra text accompanying note 13 and accompanying text. 
72 The same analysis applies to widely publicized recent cases of “jingle mail,” where a homeowner with a property 
whose value is exceeded by the outstanding balance of a mortgage mails the keys to the mortgage lender and 
voluntarily moves out. See Vikas Bajaj, Mortgage Holders Find It Hard to Walk Away from Their Homes, N.Y. 
Times, May 10, 2008, at C1. Colloquially, the homeowner’s actions amount to abandonment. Legally, they are 
forfeiture. For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 112-113. 
73 11 U.S.C. § 554(c); Jack F. Williams, The Tax Consequences of Abandonment Under the Bankruptcy Code, 67 
Temp. L. Rev. 13, 28-29 (1994).  
74 There are important exceptions, where a seller cares a great deal about the identity of a subsequent purchaser. See, 
e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1835, 1851-59, 
1894-97 (2006) (examining situations in which a profit-maximizing real estate developer might try to exclude 
particular homeowners despite their willingness to pay the market price for units in the development); Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 Va. L. Rev. 437, 444-452(2006) (analyzing 
exclusivity premiums in racially homogenous neighborhoods and Manhattan cooperative apartments). Franchise 
sales would be another classic case where one would not expect to see indifference by a seller, given the substantial 
network effects and reputational spillovers. 
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compared with the viable alternatives, abandonment holds up reasonably well. Some charities, 
like OxFam, say, may specialize in trying to get resources to the places where they will do the 
most good, but bilateral market transactions will rarely achieve this end because ability to pay 
constrains willingness to pay. Other charities, like elite law schools or well-endowed 
symphonies, make no pretense of being the most deserving recipient of donor largess, but rather 
tap into notions of reciprocity or offer signaling benefits so as to attract donors. Inter vivos gifts 
probably fare worse still on distributive grounds because social networks tend to be heavily 
stratified by socio-economic class. Thus rich people may have few interactions with the poor 
people who would be the most deserving recipients of their charity.75 Abandonment of chattel 
property, but contrast, might fare reasonably well from a distributive justice perspective, 
especially if poorer people are more likely to be traveling through public spaces where property 
is abandoned and richer people, freegans notwithstanding, are less likely to be inclined to claim 
abandoned property in public spaces.76 Of course, the location of the abandonment will have 
distributive justice implications—abandoning an item inside a gated community necessarily 
limits the universe of possible claimants.   
Upon close reflection, then, there appear to be several degrees of dice rolling, and a 
spectrum of randomization emerges in the various sorts of abandonment that we observe. At one 
pole would be pure randomization. If an individual dropped a $100 bill in a randomly selected 
spot on the globe, that act would constitute pure randomization. As best I can tell, this never 
happens. Much more common is nearly-pure randomization. The property owner leaves property 
in a particular spot, to be claimed by the first person who finds and wants it. Obviously, if the 
property is abandoned in San Francisco, right outside the abandoner’s home, then a San 
Francisco resident has a much better chance of claiming the property than someone from Little 
Rock. Geocaching, discussed earlier, is less random still. Someone who leaves behind a cache 
almost certainly has a fellow geocacher in mind as the subsequent owner, though the geocacher 
does incur the risk that a passerby may claim the property instead.77 Similarly, the sort of 
abandonment that most typically shows up in Craigslist advertisements reflects impure 
randomization. The owner will give the property to the first person who shows up at his home or 
workplace requesting it. In these cases, the abandoner has no particular recipient in mind, but he 
there may be warm-glow associated with the physical handover of the property to a particular 
                                                            
75 Cf. Arthur C. Brooks, Does Social Capital Make You Generous?, 86 Soc. Sci. Q. 1, 2-4, 9-12 (2005) (discussing 
the association between social capital and charitable giving); Bruce Rankin, How Low Income Women Find Jobs 
and Its Effects on Earnings, 30 Work & Occupations 281, 285 (2003) (discussing the stratification of social 
networks of low-income workers, and how their lack of network ties to high-income workers constrains their 
employment prospects). 
76 The first assumption seems plausible and the second probable. Affluent Americans are less likely to want to bring 
abandoned property into their residences or workplaces because they are better able to purchase a newer substitute in 
better condition and may be more sensitive to the stigma that can be associated with claiming abandoned property in 
poor condition. Indeed, this assumption is what helps solidify the identity of freeganism as a countercultural 
movement. See Kurutz, supra note 3, at F1. 
77 See supra text accompanying notes 39-40. In this sense, geocaching resembles a reciprocal charitable enterprise 
like a blood bank. Here it is abandonment’s unilateral transfer element, rather than its randomization attribute, that 
distinguishes the cases. 
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person who self selects.78 In such instances, the transfer is something of a hybrid between 
abandonment and a gift.79 Low randomization transactions occasionally appear in the free stuff 
section of Craigslist. For example, one owner of a working piano offered it for free to a needy 
church that wanted it.80 By specifying a needy church as the recipient, the owner substantially 
limited the extent to which subsequent distribution was randomized. When a transaction has such 
a limited degree of randomization, it is inappropriate to characterize the transfer as abandonment. 
Rather, it more closely resembles a class gift of the sort commonly seen in trusts and estates law.   
An owner might prefer to randomize with respect to the identity of property’s subsequent 
owner because of a desire to reduce decision costs. Seen in these terms, abandonment has 
significant social value as a way to gratuitously transfer property while minimizing the costs of 
deciding that a particular person is the most appropriate recipient. Although the stakes are 
obviously quite different, analogizing to adoption or organ donation may be helpful here. In both 
instances, individuals wishing to donate a precious resource have two options: They can specify 
a recipient or elect to roll the dice.  
The Bible contains perhaps the best known instance of child abandonment, when 
Jochebed placed the infant Moses in a basket on the Nile in the hopes that he would be spared an 
edict putting all Jewish male newborns to death.81 Acts like Jochebed’s are not the mere stuff of 
legend, however. Indeed, hers would have been a tale to which many of the Bible’s earlier 
audiences could relate. Not long ago in Western Civilization the relinquishment of newborns by 
their birth parents was startlingly commonplace. John Boswell’s definitive study of child 
abandonment presents some stark statistics: 
In the late eighteenth century in Toulouse, one child in every four was known to 
be abandoned. In poor quarters the rate reached 39.9 percent; even in rich parishes 
the rate was generally around 15 percent. In Lyons between 1750 and 1789 the 
number of children abandoned was approximately one-third the number of births. 
During the same period in Paris children known to have been abandoned account 
for between 20 and 30 percent of the registered births. . . . In Florence it ranged 
from a low of 14 percent of all baptized babies at the opening of the eighteenth 
century to a high of 43 percent early in the nineteenth. In Milan the opening of the 
                                                            
78 On warm glow, see James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow 
Giving, 100 Econ. J. 464 (1990). 
79 The law probably would characterize such a transaction as a gift, not abandonment. If someone steals the property 
from the owner’s home after an ad has been posted on Craigslist but before anyone has shown up to claim it, the 
homeowner might have a cause of action for conversion. See infra text accompanying notes 127-131. That is not 
true for property left in the alleyway. See Schmidt v. Stearman, 253 S.W.3d 35, 42 (Ark. App. 2007). On the other 
hand, if a claimant showed up to claim the property abandoned on Craigslist and the owner who posted the 
advertisement refused to surrender it, the would-be claimant might pursue a legal claim under an abandonment 
theory or equitable estoppel. Cf. Helms v. Vaughan, 467 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Ark. 1971) (noting that in the real 
property context, estoppel may legitimate abandonment); Fencl v. City of Harpers Ferry, 620 N.W.2d 808, 817 
(Iowa 2000) (same). 
80 See < http://chicago.craigslist.org/sox/zip/795845097.html> (visited Aug. 15, 2008). 
81 Jochebed “took for him a box of papyrus, and daubed it with slime and with pitch, and put the child in it; and she 
laid it in the rushes by the River’s brink.” EXODUS 2:3-2:4. 
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eighteenth century witnessed a rate of 16 percent; by its closing it was 25. . . . 
Comparable figures are not available for other nations, although fragmentary 
evidence suggests very similar urban abandonment rates ranging from 15 to 30 
percent of registered births.82  
These disturbing statistics overstate the prevalence of abandonment as the term is used in this 
paper. They include both literal abandonment—where babies and children were left up for grabs 
in public places—and instances in which babies were sold or left with people or institutions that 
were to take care of them.83 It appears that until the late Middle Ages, the abandonment of babies 
in public places was quite common, with the public setting being viewed as the locale most 
likely to cause the newborn to be noticed and taken in by a stranger—hopefully to be adopted, 
perhaps to be enslaved.84  
Over time, and apparently beginning in the late fourteenth century in Rome, foundling 
homes emerged to take in the large number of unwanted children, and they were often built with 
“a revolving door in a niche in the wall which allowed a parent or servant to deposit the child 
safely without being observed.”85 They remained an important part of European life for the next 
several centuries. Rousseau deposited five of his children in a foundling hospital in the mid-
eighteenth century.86 His subsequent explanation, written in code, contained a myriad of 
rationales for his cold-hearted conduct.87 Fascinatingly, he began by differentiating his own 
conduct from true abandonment: “He claimed that since the children had been formally 
deposited, they were not really abandoned (deposes, not trouves).”88 His distinction was quite 
right as a matter of property law, though perhaps less persuasive during an era when 70 percent 
of the infants deposited at French foundlings died within the first year of their lives.89 Rousseau’s 
second excuse echoed Penner’s autonomy-based defense of abandonment while missing entirely 
Penner’s recognition that abandonment can impose costs on third parties90: Rousseau’s “hopes of 
doing important work would have been ruined by the need to provide for a family.”91 Finally, 
Rousseau’s ultimate effort to excuse his unfathomable actions reveal some attraction to the idea 
of dice rolling when it came to the placement of children in families: “Clearly the foundling 
hospital was the best choice: it would raise the children to be sturdily self-sufficient, ‘not 
gentlemen but peasants or workers’ . . . Didn’t Plato argue that children should be brought up by 
                                                            
82 JOHN BOSWELL, THE KINDNESS OF STRANGERS: THE ABANDONMENT OF CHILDREN IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM 
LATE ANTIQUITY TO THE RENAISSANCE 15-16 (U. Chicago Press 1988). 
83 Id. at 24-25. 
84 Id. at 429-33. Because of the stigma associated with infertility, couples often were reluctant to advertise their 
willingness to adopt unwanted infants. Upon finding an abandoned child or being brought one discreetly, the 
childless couple often pretended the infant was their own offspring. Abandonment in a public place was in some 
cases a rational strategy for poor parents hoping to improve the lot of their offspring in the Middle Ages. 
85 Id. at 433. 
86 LEO DAMROSCH, JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU: RESTLESS GENIUS 191-95 (2005). 
87 Id. at 193 (“In a letter to Mme De Francueil he gave not just one explanation but several . . . in what a 
psychoanalyst would call a case of overdetermination.”). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 See supra text accompanying notes 49-50. 
91 DAMROSCH, supra note 86, at 193. 
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the state with no knowledge of their parents?”92 In short, for much of European history, the 
impulse to abandon infants was powerful, social and religious norms largely tolerated the 
practice—or, in the case of illegitimate offspring, even encouraged it93—and abandonment was 
sometimes the primary alternative to infanticide or baby selling.  
  The revolving doors of early foundling houses have contemporary echoes in modern 
Europe and America.94 During the gilded age, Americans celebrated what one might call reverse 
Rousseauian dice-rolling: stories of abandoned babies being adopted by wealthy elites.95  In 
contemporary America, only about 1.5 percent of newborns are placed up for adoption,96 but the 
impulse to roll the dice with respect to placement of a child has not dissipated fully. Closed 
adoptions, where the birth parents had no say in the placement of their offspring and remained 
anonymous, were long the norm in the United States, though that is quickly changing.97 The 
shifting practices may result from the desire of most birth parents to exercise greater control over 
the identities of their children’s adoptive parents. Many birth parents, interviewed after the fact, 
“expressed incredulity that they entrusted their child to strangers,” and nearly half of the birth 
parents described the decision to give their children up for adoption as a mistake they wished 
they could undo.98 Yet rolling the dice remains attractive to a minority of birth parents. This is 
particularly true for parents wishing to avoid the complexity of relationships with a child they 
have relinquished and a new set of parents who have displaced them.99 Not surprisingly, few 
                                                            
92 Id. at 193-94. There was, of course, a possibility that the infants would be placed with well-off families, but 
Rousseau was accurately gauging the odds. 
93 Id. at 192. 
94 See JULIE MILLER, ABANDONED: FOUNDLINGS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK CITY 226-27 (2008) (noting 
that during the early 1880s, an average of 2,041 infants per year were left at one of four foundling hospitals in New 
York City) ; Elisabetta Povoledo, Updating an Old Way to Leave a Baby on the Doorstep, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 
2007, at A4 (discussing the introduction of high-tech foundling wheels in Europe). Consider also American laws 
that provide parents with the opportunity to abandon babies at fire stations and other designated places without fear 
of criminal liability. See Cynthia Dailard, The Drive to Enact ‘Infant Abandonment’ Laws – A Rush to Judgment?, 
Guttmacher Report on Pub. Pol’y, Aug. 2000, at 1-2; Lee Anne Fennell, Anxiety and Alienability 41 & n. 189, 122 
Harv. L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2009) (Aug. 11, 2008 draft) (on file with author); Eric Eckholm, Law’s Effect: An 
Iowa Girl Is Abandoned in Nebraska, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 2008, at A15. These laws for the most part have not been 
terribly efficacious. See Dailard, supra , at 2 (“In the case of public abandonment, the women are often not mature 
enough to thoughtfully weigh their options or the consequences of their actions. . . . [S]ince the Texas law took 
effect, 12 infants have been illegally abandoned – and not one was turned in under the terms of the law.”). An 
exception was Nebraska’s short-lived abandonment statute, which, due to poor drafting, permitted parents to 
abandon any child under 18 at hospitals with impunity. Three dozen children, including many teenagers from out of 
state, were abandoned in Nebraska before the legislature modified the law to apply only to infants. See Nicholas 
Riccardi, State Revamps Haven Law, L.A. Times, Nov. 22, 2008, at 10; California Teen Is Last to Be Abandoned 
Under Law, L.A. Times, Nov. 23, 2008, at 28. 
95 MILLER, supra note 94, at 237-38. 
96 BOSWELL, supra note 82, at 16. 
97 Marianne Berry et al., The Role of Open Adoption in the Adjustment of Adopted Children and Their Families, 20 
Children & Youth Serv. Rev. 151, 152-54 (1998). 
98 Phyllis R. Silverman, Reunions Between Adoptees and Birth Parents: The Birth Parents’ Experience, Social 
Work, Nov.-Dec. 1988, at 523, 523, 527. So too with Rousseau, who tried unsuccessfully to discover the 
whereabouts of his first abandoned child ten years after the fact. See DAMROSCH, supra note 86, at 191-92. 
99 Adrienne D. Kraft et al., Some Theoretical Considerations on Confidential Adoptions, Part I: The Birth Mother, 2 
Child & Adolescent Soc. Work. 13, 18 (1985). 
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parents opt for anything approximating pure randomization here—individuals choosing closed 
adoptions typically hand over their newborns to adoption agencies or local authorities for 
placement with adoptive parents.100 The parent who gives up a child for adoption to an agency is 
opting out of the wrenching decisions as to which adoptive parent(s) are most deserving or can 
provide the best home. In such cases, it seems that avoiding these decision costs is a way for the 
biological parents to reduce their psychological bond with their offspring and perhaps help 
protect their anonymity.101 Rolling the dice makes it easier for the biological parents to move on. 
In the organ donation context, pure randomization similarly does not exist. The universe 
of potential recipients is limited to people in need of a transplant. But this wrinkle is not unlike 
abandonment of other forms of property—like geocaching—where the claimant of positive 
market value property will surely be someone who wants it and expends some effort to take 
possession. Live kidney donations to relatives and acquaintances are far more common than live 
donations to strangers.102 Indeed, many transplant centers refuse to accept kidney donations in 
the absence of a genetic or social relationship between the donor and donee.103 The few 
transplant centers that permit individuals to donate a kidney anonymously to the top person on 
the kidney waiting list have performed a little over a hundred such transplants in the United 
States.104 In the context of bone marrow donation, where the costs of being a donor are lower 
                                                            
100 There will occasionally be horrific contemporary circumstances in which a newborn is abandoned in a dumpster 
or public restroom – this occurs approximately 100 times per year in the United States. See Marcia E. Herman-
Giddens, Newborns Killed or Left to Die by a Parent: A Population Based Study, 58 Obstetrical & Gyn. Survey 580, 
580 (2003). In our age, these instances often do not approximate true abandonment. A newborn is sufficiently fragile 
that being left alone for any significant amount of time may result in its death, and about a third of the infants 
abandoned in public places are found dead, so these acts seem more akin to attempted murder or manslaughter. Id. 
Moreover, such babies are not deemed “up for grabs” by either the law or social norms. Birth parents presumably 
recognize that the finder will almost certainly notify law enforcement upon finding that baby, and the baby will be 
placed in a suitable home.  
101 Cf. Elsbeth Neil, The Reasons Why Young Children Are Placed for Adoption: Findings from a Recently Placed 
Sample and a Discussion of Implications for Subsequent Identity Development, 5 Children & Family Social Work 
303, 312 (2000) (providing data about British birth parents).  
102 Antonia J.Z. Henderson, The Living Anonymous Kidney Donor: Lunatic or Saint?, 3 Am. J. Transplant. 203, 203 
(2003) (“In the last two years, 31 anonymous donations out of a total of 11672 living donations were performed in 
the U.S.”); Daniel Akst, Taste: The Kindness of Strangers, Wall St. J. , July 25, 2008, at W11 (describing one of the 
534 Americans who have “given a kidney away without a recipient in mind” since 1984).  
Interestingly enough, the donor profiled by Akst, a securities trader named Anthony DeGiulio who wanted 
his kidney to go to a stranger, was someone the journalist met “in the spring of 2006 when he advertised some free 
mulch on Craigslist. . . . Subsequently, after clearing some land, he gave away thousands of dollars of firewood to 
all comers.” Akst, supra, at W11. Perhaps the list of Craigslist abandoners and kidney abandoners have significant 
overlap. 
103 See Bernard S. Kaplan & Karen Polise, In Defense of Altruistic Kidney Donation by Strangers, 14 J. Pediatric 
Nephrology 518, 518-21 (2000). Evidently, these policies are based on a refusal to believe that such donations are 
genuinely altruistic. Of course, there is reason to be concerned that many directed kidney donations within families 
are coercive, but these donations tend not to be closely scrutinized. See N. Scheper-Hughes, The Tyranny of the Gift: 
Sacrificial Violence in Living Donor Transplants, 7 Am. J. Transplant. 507, 507-10 (2007). 
104 Cheryl L. Jacobs, et al., Twenty-Two Nondirected Kidney Donors: An Update on a Single Center’s Experience, 4 
Am. J. Transplant. 1110, 1114 (2004). 
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than those associated with surrendering a kidney but higher than donating blood,105 donation to a 
stranger is more common, but still unusual.106 Most blood is donated to strangers, though 
relatives may bank blood to be used by a loved one before an operation.107 The trend with 
donations of biological material appear to be, then, that random transfers are very uncommon 
when the donor is most reluctant to part with the resource in question and become more common 
as the donor approaches indifference as to whether or not to part with the resource. Seen in this 
light, some biological parents’ willingness to roll the dice with respect to the identities of 
adoptive parents makes more sense. These birth parents’ motivation to part with their offspring is 
quite strong. 
Plainly, the decision costs associated with the abandonment of a child or the 
relinquishment of a transplantable organ are going to dwarf the decision costs associated with the 
abandonment of most property. As suggested above, relinquishing a child often results in 
significant regret and psychological trauma. But one need not equate the magnitude of these 
costs in order to recognize the similarities. Deciding to abandon property is no easier than 
deciding to donate it, but having decided on abandonment the owner need no longer worry about 
the identity of the subsequent recipient.108 Historical and contemporary practice suggests that this 
benefit was substantial in the case of very high stakes resources and there is little reason to think 
that the benefits of reduced decision costs would not manifest themselves in lower stake contexts 
too. 
The transaction costs savings associated with abandonment also can be significant. 
Suppose an owner has a positive market-value asset that he no longer wants. Consider the 
alternatives to abandonment. A sale will bring the owner revenue, but may also require the 
expenditure of time, money, and effort. If the market for a product is well-developed, then the 
owner will be drawn toward a sale. For that reason the rise of eBay probably resulted in a large 
decline in the prevalence of abandoned property.109 But even in a nation of ubiquitous eBay 
access and scores of eBay drop centers, many owners still put chattel property on the sidewalk. 
From this we can infer that the transaction costs of even eBay sales are not negligible. Sellers 
                                                            
105 Galen E. Switzer, Understanding Donors’ Motivations: A Study of Unrelated Bone Marrow Donors, 45 Soc. Sci. 
Med. 137, 139 (1997). 
106 See Roberta G. Simmons et al., The Self-Image of Unrelated Bone Marrow Donors, J. Health & Soc. Behav. 285, 
288 (1993) (noting that 965 people donated bone marrow to a stranger between 1987 and 1991). 
107 See Theresa W. Gillespie & Christopher D. Hillyer, Blood Donors and Factors Impacting the Blood Donation 
Decision, 16 Transfusion Med. Rev. 115, 120 (2002) (noting that 10% of blood donors surveyed were giving blood 
“to cover their own potential needs in the future”); Simone A. Glynn, Motivations to Donate Blood: Demographic 
Comparisons, 42 Transfusion 216, 218 (2002) (noting that among 52,650 blood donors sampled only 7,062 were 
excluded because they had given an apharesis or directed blood donation). 
108 For a rich discussion of the relationship between randomization and decision costs in adjudication, see Adam M. 
Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication 9-18 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Samaha picks up some 
of the provocative threads concerning randomization in criminal investigations and punishment contained in Bernard 
E. Harcourt, Post-Modern Meditations on Punishment: On the Limits of Reason and the Virtues of Randomization 
(A Polemic and Manifesto for the Twenty-First Century), 74 Soc. Res. 307, 330-35 (2007). 
109 See generally David Lucking-Reiley, Pennies from eBay: The Determinants of Price in Online Auctions, 55 J. 
Indus. Econ. 223 (2007) (discussing the mechanics of auctions on eBay). 
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must compose an advertisement for the product, specify a duration for the auction, communicate 
with the winning bidder about payment and shipping, arrange for delivery, and run the risk that 
the buyer will defraud them. A repeat player seller may well find it worth his while to lawyer up 
as well, so as to reduce the risk that he will be sued if buyers emerge from their transactions 
unhappy or if the property sold injures its purchaser. 
The transaction costs of gifts are not negligible either. In deciding upon a recipient for a 
gift, the donor must evaluate that donee’s preferences and existing assets. No one wants to be the 
resented gift giver who donates a tyrannical heirloom to a loved one, a gift that the recipient does 
not want but feels guilty discarding.110 Then, having decided upon a recipient, the donor must 
arrange for delivery, which again will entail the costs and inconvenience of a trip to the post 
office to the recipient’s home.  
A recent exogenous shock illustrates some of these transaction costs. Recently, most 
major American airlines have begun charging their customers for bringing checked luggage on 
flights. It is almost certainly the case that this new pricing policy has increased the prevalence of 
property abandonment.111 Suppose a family is going on a two-week vacation and renting a 
condominium that does not provide infant cribs. A two-week crib rental typically exceeds the 
cost of a travel crib purchase, so the rational traveler will simply buy a travel crib upon reaching 
his destination, use it for two weeks, and then abandon it at the conclusion of the trip. Surely, the 
crib purchaser would prefer to donate the crib to a needy family, but the costs of locating a local 
needy family and arranging for delivery on the last day of a vacation will be prohibitively high. 
The cost of bringing the crib home in checked luggage will exceed the crib’s market value. 
Destruction of the crib seems wasteful, so abandonment is almost certainly going to be the most 
sensible option for our vacationers. 
In short, both sales and gifts are bilateral transactions, and such transactions necessarily 
entail transaction costs. In some cases, the property to be transferred is sufficiently valuable that 
these transaction costs are easily overcome. But where the property in question does not have a 
particularly high value, where the nature of the property raises the transaction costs of a sale or 
gift (e.g., a bulky item, like a refrigerator, or an item that cannot be sent via the mail readily, like 
a firearm) or where the possessor wishes to hide the fact of his possession (perhaps because the 
goods are stolen), the odds that the owner will opt for a unilateral means of relinquishment 
increase. 
Once we recall that the universe of unilateral relinquishment is limited to abandonment 
and destruction, we develop a better understanding of the dangers of restricting abandonment too 
much. With respect to a positive market-value asset, society is generally better off if the owner 
opts for abandonment over destruction. Permitting destruction and forbidding abandonment of 
these assets is folly. With respect to a negative market-value asset, the reverse is usually true. 
                                                            
110 See supra note 21 and text accompanying note 20. 
111 For an assessment of other consumer behavior changes in response to this fee structure, see Susan Stellin, 
Passengers Learn to Live with Airlines’ Big Fees, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 2008, at B1. 
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Even this simple axiom about negative market value property, however, is subject to two 
caveats. 
First, note that there are two kinds of negative value assets. The first sort is a resource 
with no intrinsic value, such as a rotting pineapple, a broken stapler, or a sound recording by 
William Hung. For these assets, society certainly prefers that the owner destroy the asset rather 
than abandoning it, which externalizes the disposal costs to society. The second kind is a 
resource that comes bundled with a liability that exceeds its positive intrinsic value. Consider a 
house worth $50,000 with tax liens against it totaling $75,000. Recall that such an asset’s 
negative value stems entirely from the bundling of different sticks in the bundle of property 
rights, such that unbundling will yield a positive-value resource.112 Here, destruction of the 
underlying asset is extremely undesirable, because it eliminates a productive resource and 
imposes a $75,000 loss on the lien holder. Permissive abandonment—a rule that would allow the 
owner to walk away from the resource and the liability—is not as bad, because it preserves the 
intrinsically valuable asset while imposing the same loss on the lien holder, though a rule 
permitting such abandonment may well spark a lawless race. The superior rule in these instances 
would prohibit abandonment and require the lien holder to foreclose on or otherwise take 
possession of the property and force its sale. This is precisely what U.S. law does.113 The lien 
holder can now auction off an unencumbered asset, presumably fetching a $50,000 return, 
resulting in a loss of only $25,000. Foreclosure thus dominates permissive abandonment because 
it forestalls a lawless race and provides the lien holder with some security in the event of a 
default, which will increase a lien holder’s willingness to extend credit ex ante.   
 Second, recall our concern over lawless race costs. If abandonment of a positive value 
asset causes a large number of people to engage in violent jostling or other tortious behavior to 
be the first to retrieve it, then society suffers. It is conceivable that with respect to valuable 
property where the expected disposal costs are low, the transaction costs of a bilateral transfer 
are high, and the expected risk of a lawless race is high, destruction—rather than abandonment—
is social welfare maximizing.114 Though these cases can be expected to be rare, this analysis 
suggests that society’s openness toward abandonment ought to be a function of its baseline level 
of law-abiding behavior.   
There are other important considerations that bear on the question of whether the law 
should attempt to shift owners between abandonment and its alternatives. Abandonment is the 
method of intentionally relinquishing property that most frequently gives rise to confusion costs. 
That is a legitimate reason for curtailing the practice. Sales and gifts are rarely confusing, though 
it might not seem that way to law students and legal academics because cases involving 
                                                            
112 See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.  
113 See supra text accompanying note 72. 
114 Sales and gifts, like destruction, avoid the costs that may be associated with a lawless race. This explains the 
reference to transaction costs in the above sentence. 
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ambiguity are a staple of law school casebooks.115 There can be no confusion about the 
ownership of property that has been destroyed. But historically, when property has been 
abandoned, the result is ambiguity that imposes costs on the third parties who are charged with 
respecting in rem rights.116 To push the point further, as the fraction of seemingly unpossessed 
property that is abandoned rises, the odds that lost or mislaid property will be returned to its 
rightful owner fall.117  
Mistakes may also arise more frequently in the abandonment context. Whereas the 
negotiations involved in a sale and the communication typically associated with a gift provide a 
property owner with valuable information about how third parties assess the value of an asset, 
the unilateral nature of abandonment deprives the resource owner of this information, raising the 
odds of a mistake. Notably, however, abandonment dominates destruction on this score, because 
the latter is irrevocable and the former is not. If nobody claims property that an owner has 
abandoned, the prior owner is as entitled as anyone else to retake possession.  
One can imagine a regime taking a hard line against both abandonment and destruction. 
Deprived of both unilateral means of relinquishment, how might we expect property owners to 
behave?  They might fall back on the gift or sale strategies. Or, quite possibly, they might allow 
property to gather dust. This is another common, and generally undertheorized property right. 
When exercised it removes productive assets from the economy, contributes to clutter, and can 
impose significant costs on next of kin when the property remains in storage until the owner’s 
demise. Contrasted with this alternative, abandonment and perhaps even destruction seem rather 
attractive.  
II. The Law of Abandonment 
In the United States there are a variety of statutes governing abandonment. All are 
subject-matter-specific. We can identify five basic approaches that manifest themselves in 
American law: A) Permissive regimes; B) Prohibition regimes; C) Escheat regimes; D) 
Licensing regimes; and E) Encouragement regimes.  
A. Permissive Regimes 
As the name implies, a permissive regime is one in which the abandonment of property 
by its owner is typically lawful, and the first person who takes possession of the property 
becomes its new owner, with rights good against the entire world. Setting aside pets and 
                                                            
115 See, e.g., Gruen v. Gruen, 496 N.E.2d 869 (N.Y., 1986) (ambiguity in a famous gifts case); Newman v. Bost, 29 
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116 See, e.g., Poggi v. Scott, 139 P. 815, 816 (Cal. 1914) (holding that the owner of a building who sold barrels, 
which he in good faith thought to be empty and abandoned was liable for conversion when it turned out that the 
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hazardous waste, this is the rule that governs the majority of abandoned chattel property. While 
there may be time, place, and manner restrictions on such abandonment (e.g., via anti-littering 
laws, attractive nuisance causes of action in tort, or restrictions on abandoning a car in the middle 
of the road), the law’s attitude is appropriately characterized as a permissive one. Hence, a 
newspaper publisher may leave two-thousand copies of its newspaper in a publicly accessible 
place, to be picked up by whomever wants some free reading materials,118 and consumers may 
happily drink free beverage samples at a grocery store without worrying about being confronted 
with a bill or violating the law.119  
The Trademark regime under the Lanham Act is perhaps the most widely known example 
of a permissive abandonment regime. Under the section 45 of the Lanham Act, a mark is 
considered abandoned if its “use has been discontinued with intent not to resume use.”120 The 
statute provides further that nonuse for three years will establish a prima facie case of 
abandonment.121 As interpreted by the courts, “intent not to resume use” is a lower standard than 
“intent to abandon,” with the result being that if a trademark holder intends to resume use at 
some point in the indefinite future, a finding of statutory abandonment is appropriate.122  The 
permissive nature of the abandonment regime stems from the policies underlying trademark law. 
Trademark is an intellectual property regime in which rights are conferred upon firms for the 
benefit of consumers. Trademark rights are like water rights or the rights to remain in rent 
controlled housing, and unlike fee simple rights, in that use is a condition of continued 
ownership.123 Truly permanent ownership of a mark may, therefore, be more achievable in 
theory than in practice. In the trademark context, the user removes a word, phrase, or symbol 
from the public domain, but in so doing lessens the likelihood of consumer confusion, permits 
the user to invest in good will, and lowers consumer search costs.124 When a trademark falls into 
disuse, there is no longer any justification for impoverishing the public domain, however 
slightly, so the mark is returned to the commons, where it can be appropriated by any other firm 
that wishes to use it in commerce. Note that in this important sense copyright diverges from 
trademark. Once a copyrighted work is dedicated to the public domain, it can never be privately 
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owned again.125  Copyright “abandonment” is therefore in some sense an inapt phrase in the 
same way that abandonment of incorporeal interests in land and bankruptcy abandonments are 
misnomers.126 There is no “roll” of the dice following the abandonment of a copyright—
ownership of an abandoned copyrighted work is necessarily public.  
A good example of the permissive approach being embraced by the common law courts, 
despite the possibility of negative externalities associated with abandonment, is Long v. Dilling 
Mechanical Contractors.127 In that case, Dilling placed trash in an unlocked dumpster on its 
personal property, two feet from the sidewalk. Long, a labor organizer hoping to unionize 
Dilling’s workplace, removed several bags of trash from Dilling’s dumpster, hoping to find the 
names and contact information of Dilling employees so that he could contact them. After 
learning about this conduct, Dilling alleged that Long had stolen its property—which it asserted 
had not been abandoned but rather left in the dumpster to be taken away by a trash-hauling 
company with which Dilling had contracted.128 Dilling sued Long for civil violations of 
Indiana’s laws against theft, burglary, criminal trespass, and corrupt business practices. The 
appellate court reversed a finding of liability against Long, holding that the trash had been 
abandoned successfully when Dilling placed it in the dumpster.129 Implicit in this analysis is the 
idea that it would have been proper for Dilling to abandon its refuse in a dumpster, even if it had 
ceased paying a waste removal company to empty the dumpster at particular intervals. Such a 
rule might pose problems if the waste piles up because no one comes along to remove the refuse 
voluntarily—a situation that has described Naples, Italy, for much of the last year.130 But the 
Long court presumably thought that nuisance law could kick in at that point, particularly in the 
case of an owner who dumped trash on his own property. In Sharpe v. Turley, a recent case with 
very similar facts and the same arguments posed by counsel, the Texas courts parted ways with 
Long, holding that trash left in a dumpster was not abandoned. The court held that the party 
depositing its trash in a dumpster does not intend to leave the property to whomever wishes to 
take possession of it, but rather wishes to transfer it to a waste-hauling firm for disposal.131 The 
Sharpe court seemed to think it was decisive that the property owner and waste hauling firm had 
a contract requiring the latter to remove the former’s waste. But it is not clear whether this 
contract’s existence or terms resolved the issue one way or another. The contract could well have 
been construed to require the waste hauling firm to remove only that waste which had not been 
disposed of by a third party prior to the hauling firm’s arrival upon the premises.    
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B. Prohibition 
Prohibition regimes sometimes arise in the context of chattel property. For example, most 
American states explicitly categorize the abandonment of pets or livestock as animal cruelty, 
punishable as a misdemeanor.132  One rationale for the prohibitory rule is that an unowned 
animal may create negative externalities by spreading disease, breeding strays, or colliding with 
motor vehicles. The dominant explanation for the prohibitory rule, however, likely stems from 
the animals’ status as living things that are capable of suffering. The abandonment of an animal 
typically diminishes its welfare. The criminal prohibition against abandonment thus encourages 
owners to relinquish ownership in a manner that will be less harmful to the animal in question by 
donating the animal to a shelter.  
Prohibition regimes are most prominent in the context of real estate. The leading case 
here is Pocono Springs Civic Association v. MacKenzie,133 which held that perfect title to real 
property cannot be abandoned. Note, however, that lesser interests in land are treated differently. 
The conventional account holds that at common law, corporeal hereditaments like fee simple 
interests could not be abandoned, but incorporeal interests (e.g., easements, mineral interests, and 
licenses) could.134 This account is incorrect as a matter of logic.135 In any event, the common 
explanation for the distinction in the legal treatment of corporeal and incorporeal interests is 
historical. Essentially, in the English feudal system, the crown could not tolerate the non-
ownership of land between the time of abandonment and reclamation because no feudal incidents 
would be paid in the interim. As one commentator notes: 
The continuing validity of the policy against voids and gaps in the chain of title 
may be open to criticism insofar as its only function was to protect a certain 
political relationship of the feudal system that is no longer in existence. The 
services, or incidents, that a tenant was required to perform for his lord were not 
personal obligations, but obligations that ran with the land. The rule against 
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abandonment . . . was designed to protect the lord by ensuring that he would 
always have a tenant to whom he could look for performance of the incidents.136 
Superficially, there appears to be a contemporary analog to these feudal incidents that would 
justify the law’s antagonism toward the abandonment of real property. Real property taxes are 
the modern-day equivalent of feudal incidents. Hence state and local governments might 
conclude that for some period of time, there will be no one to pay a tax bill on an abandoned 
parcel, even though the parcel presumably requires some expenditure of state resources (e.g., for 
preventing crime on the property or maintaining nearby roads). In theory, the same policy 
argument could preclude the abandonment of chattel property. But chattel property is not 
typically subject to state and local property taxes, at least not in the United States. Hence the 
interim period where there is no record owner ordinarily does not directly deprive the 
government of revenue.  
 Under scrutiny, however, this static argument for the common law rule breaks down. 
Real property that is abandoned, like chattel property that is abandoned, often has negative 
market value, in which case the state should not be levying taxes against it. To the extent that the 
state does levy taxes, it does so on the basis of outdated information about the resource’s value or 
an unwillingness to foreclose on its tax liens. If the property in question has positive market 
value, then it should be taxed by the state, but it should also be claimed by a new owner in short 
order. If nobody claims such property, this suggests the presence of severe informational 
asymmetries. Namely, would-be owners of the land might not know of its availability, might 
worry about whether it has actually been abandoned, or might infer from the fact of 
abandonment that the property in question is actually a negative value asset. The correct legal 
response to this situation is not a blanket prohibition on the abandonment of real property, but an 
effort to supplement the information available to those who would like to take ownership.  
 A better argument for the common law rule prohibiting abandonment of fee simple 
interests in land tackles the problem not from the static perspective outlined above, but from a 
dynamic one. Namely, a regime that prevents individuals from abandoning real property might 
encourage them to use the property in a more sustainable way. We can look to the Brazilian rain 
forests for an example of how the common law might improve social welfare. It is common for 
Brazilian ranchers to chop down portions of the Amazon rain forest, use the land quite 
intensively for ranching cattle, and then, typically within eight years, abandon the land, which 
will have become worthless scrubland thanks to overgrazing.137 The rancher then moves on to 
greener pastures (or forests) and begins the process anew. As a civil law country, Brazil permits 
the abandonment of real property.138  Were it to prohibit abandonment, the law might encourage 
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land owners to evaluate their own practices with a longer time horizon in mind, shifting 
strategies from slash-and-burn to techniques more in line with maximizing the long term value of 
the property.139 On this account, the common law rule regarding abandonment might function as 
a defense against economic conditions that encourage short-sighted uses of land.140  
Needless to say, prohibiting the abandonment of real property is hardly the optimal legal 
intervention for furthering these objectives. Suppose that the legal system sensibly assesses 
property taxes based on a parcel’s peak value rather than its current value as a mechanism to 
buttress a rule against abandonment. Ranchers might try to circumvent the law by selling the 
property if it has been depleted for a very low amount to a judgment-proof buyer.141 Direct 
prohibitions on consumptive uses of land or Pigouvian taxes on such uses are bound to be more 
effective, assuming they can be enforced to the same degree as a prohibition on abandonment. 
On this point there is little reason to think that the prohibition on abandonment can be enforced 
any more efficiently than these alternatives.142 For instance, if the remedy for abandonment is the 
imposition of continued tax liability on the abandoner, then a Pigouvian tax—which could be 
imposed on a landowner while he still possesses and has an economic interest in the property—
always will be superior to a remedy that tries to extract tax revenue from an owner who has left 
the property behind.  
Note that there may be contexts in which promoting “sustainability” by prohibiting 
abandonment is questionable or even undesirable. To analogize, consider two hypothetical ivory 
tower workplaces. The first faculty is extremely risk averse, finding the prospect of a tenure 
battle intolerable. As a result, it virtually never hires untenured professors and those rare souls 
that do get hired are extremely “safe” scholarly prospects. The second faculty is less risk averse. 
Although it regards tenure denials as tragic for the scholars involved and very unfortunate for the 
institution, it is willing to “abandon” a scholar at tenure time if he or she has not demonstrated 
excellent scholarship and teaching. If upside reward and downside risk are correlated, then we 
can expect that the second faculty’s hires will have greater potential to become stars than the first 
faculty’s. In a world where faculties one and two are competing for talent, it is by no means 
obvious that either strategy will dominate, and a great deal of self-sorting may occur. But flatly 
prohibiting abandonment in this academic context has costs that are more apparent here than they 
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are in the Amazon.143 This analogy might help us see a downside to overly restrictive 
abandonment rules in real and chattel property contexts. Suppose there are a large number of 
distressed homes in a community, or polluted parcels that may have substantial mineral wealth 
underneath. A rule prohibiting abandonment in these contexts might ensure that these resources 
go underutilized because of the risks associated with trying to repair and exploit the resources in 
question. Seen in this light, a rule permitting abandonment functions as a kind of insurance 
policy for investors in high-risk, high-reward property.  
C. Escheat 
An escheat regime is one in which abandoned property automatically becomes the 
property of the jurisdiction in which it is abandoned or in which the abandoning owner resides. It 
is worth mentioning that an escheat regime, by its nature, entails no “roll of the dice,” at least if 
the abandoning owner is informed of the law. Put another way, we might conceptualize 
abandonment in an escheat jurisdiction as a gift to the state.144   
The leading example of an escheat regime is the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act of 
1995, which has been enacted in all fifty states and provides a framework by which unclaimed 
property is transferred to state governments after a specified period of time. The Act provides, 
for example, that travelers checks become the property of the state fifteen years after issuance 
and the same happens to money orders after seven years.145 The contents of a safe deposit box 
belong to the state five years after the expiration of the lease for the box, presuming the owner 
has not reclaimed them in the interim.146 The Act provides that states must advertise the 
availability of the unclaimed property for a period of time, usually three years, and may auction 
the property and retain the proceeds thereafter.147 Critically, there is no inquiry into the owner’s 
intent under the statute. Even if an owner has forgotten about, lost, or mislaid property, it will be 
presumed abandoned at the end of the applicable statutory term.148 The chief advantage of 
uniformity here is that it facilitates the creation of a national registry of unclaimed property. This 
registry is readily searchable on the Internet, where one popular clearinghouse contains data 
about unclaimed property in 44 states.149  
The rationale for state ownership, then, is to increase the chances that the lost, mislaid, or 
forgotten property will be reunified with its original owner by enabling the growth of a single 
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database where original owners can recover their belongings.150 It is likely, however, that state 
ownership is not optimal in this regard—besides passively making information about lost 
property available to people who are savvy enough to search for it, and incurring storage costs 
(usually trivial in the case of currency or other paper assets), the states appear to do little to 
justify their possession of the property. States have returned merely 4% of the unclaimed 
property obtained under the Act to its original owners.151 Almost certainly, private firms given 
financial incentives to track down owners could achieve a better success rate. Perhaps the 
argument for state ownership is that it is the least bad of the alternatives—returning the property 
in question to the bank, landlord, or gift-certificate issuing vendor might encourage that party to 
take steps to increase the odds that property will be unclaimed.152 That is a strategy that ought 
not to be particularly successful in a competitive marketplace, however, if consumers are well-
informed and will avoid doing business ex ante with companies that have less forgiving policies 
in this regard. It may be that the stakes are sufficiently low, optimistic bias is sufficiently 
prevalent, or the perceived salience of the unclaimed property issue is negligible, which would 
help buttress the justification for the escheat regime. Indeed, it is worth wondering whether the 
goal of reunifying individuals with property they have forgotten about is a worthy one—perhaps 
the law should encourage owners to take more precautions with their travelers checks and money 
orders. 
Another well-established escheat regime is the federal Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 
1987 (ASA). The Act provides that any abandoned ship that is embedded in or located on the 
submerged lands of a state (extending into the ocean up to three miles from land) are the 
property of that state.153 The meaning of abandonment under the act is quite similar to the 
common law meaning of property abandonment—the owner has deserted it and manifested an 
intention of relinquishing ownership.154 Intent, which is ignored in the Uniform Unclaimed 
Property Act, therefore becomes quite important under the ASA. To show abandonment, it is not 
necessary that the original owner actively disclaimed title, unless the vessel was a military or 
other governmental ship.155 There is some disagreement in the federal courts as to whether the 
party seeking to show abandonment must do so via clear and convincing evidence of express 
abandonment.156 The typical posture of ASA litigation is that someone has found an 
undiscovered shipwreck and purchased any claims to it from the successors of the vessel’s owner 
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(usually an insurance company).157 The government then argues that the vessel was abandoned, 
whereas the discoverer argues that it was not. The primary criticism of the ASA suggests that it 
underincentivizes the socially useful task of finding abandoned shipwrecks and prompts some 
salvaging companies to fail to report their finds.158 Its defenders argue that states have stronger 
incentives to ensure that abandoned shipwrecks will be preserved for historical and archeological 
purposes, rather than stripped of valuable assets in a hasty way.159  
D. Licensing 
A licensing regime is one in which governmental consent is required in order for an 
individual or entity to abandon property. A railway seeking to abandon an unprofitable or 
otherwise undesired line has needed the permission of the federal government to do so since 
1920.160 The right to block railway abandonments was initially vested in the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, and has been exercised by the Surface Transportation Board (STB) 
since the Commission’s demise.161 The petition for a declaration of abandonment can be brought 
by either the railway line owner itself or an affected landowner.162 In deciding whether to 
approve an application for abandonment, the STB is to weigh the interests of those who have 
been served by the existing line against the interests of the railroad and the transportation system 
as a whole.163  
The licensing regime for railroad rights of way is rather unusual, but best explained by 
the heavily regulated nature of the railroad industry. Railway carriers, like telephone and cable 
providers, may be required to serve some unprofitable customers in exchange for limited 
monopoly protection in servicing profitable ones. In deciding whether to permit the 
abandonment of a rail line, the STB is really deciding whether to permit the abandonment of a 
railway’s promise to provide service to a particular community. The law thus notes the 
externalities associated with property abandonment and refuses to permit abandonment where 
those negative externalities would be too great. In that sense, the licensing regime resembles the 
prohibition regime, which attempts to limit abandonment where abandonment entails significant 
negative externalities. The law similarly would frown on a landowner who agreed to purchase 
for a nominal amount two connected parcels of land, one of which had high value, and the other 
of which had negative value because of contamination, and then tried to abandon the 
contaminated parcel without remediating the pollution. A licensing regime may well be superior 
to the common law prohibition on the abandonment of land because it contains an escape hatch 
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that is responsive to changed circumstances. On the other hand, because decision making is 
committed to an administrative agency, there is a risk of interest group capture. If such capture 
occurs, then railway abandonment may begin to resemble a permissive regime. 
E. Promoting Abandonment?    
We have established that the state might flatly permit or prohibit abandonment, exercise 
discretion about when abandonment can occur, or take possession of abandoned property itself. 
In theory, there is also the possibility that the law will actually encourage abandonment—
privileging it over gifts, sales, and destruction. In practice, it is hard to imagine why a 
jurisdiction would want to do this—the benefits of abandonment are real, but they flow mostly to 
the abandoning owner, not to society writ large. That said, we can find something that looks a bit 
like an abandonment promotion regime in one jurisdiction’s treatment of animals. 
Under Mississippi law, if the owner of an animal abandons it, the remedy for that 
abandonment is seizure by the state.164 The statute provides a series of procedural protections for 
the owners of such animals to reclaim them if they can show that they would care for it 
adequately in the future. Upon their failure to do so, the law provides for transfer of title to an 
animal control agency for the purposes of providing euthanasia where appropriate, or the animals 
may be auctioned off, with the proceeds used to repay the state for boarding costs, and any 
remainder returned to the abandoning owner.165 No other jurisdiction has the same statutory 
language on the books, and whereas animal abandonment is a crime in most other jurisdictions, it 
appears not to be one in Mississippi. The regime in Mississippi is thus a strange hybrid of 
systems for regulating abandonment. It has aspects of an escheat regime, in that the state plays a 
large role in disposing of the property. But in its operation, it most closely resembles a 
permissive regime taken to the extreme. If an animal owner abandons the animal, the state will 
go to the trouble of selling off or destroying it, and, in the case of sale—which seems most likely 
in the case of livestock—the state will forward any profits to the owner. It is hard to come up 
with any rational explanation for why Mississippi would embrace this regime—it most likely 
reflects poor drafting of a legal framework that was designed to minimize the resistance of an 
abusive or neglectful owner to state intervention. Extending that regime to cover animal 
abandonment may have been an instance of cognitive dissonance by legislators. In any event, the 
unusual law as written appears to have generated little controversy and has gone unnoticed in the 
legal scholarship.166  
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III. A Proposal for Rationalizing the Law of Abandonment 
Having reviewed the motivations for abandonment, the different types of property that 
might be abandoned, and the existing legal regimes governing abandonment in the United States, 
it is time to ask how, if at all, the law might be improved. In light of the social benefits 
associated with abandonment and its utility to property owners, the law should strive to permit 
abandonment while mitigating the associated negative externalities. Namely, the law should 
attempt to mitigate confusion costs, deterioration costs, and error costs, while reducing disposal 
costs in the case of negative value property and lawless race costs in the case of high value 
property.  
A. Negative Market Value Property 
Let us begin by recalling the different types of abandoned property and the bright-line-
rules that the law has created to govern their abandonment. The abandonment of positive 
subjective value, negative market value goods is plainly undesirable, though it almost never 
occurs. When such resources are abandoned, we can expect that no one will claim the abandoned 
property, which may cause it to be reclaimed by the owner if its subjective value has not 
deteriorated too much in the interim. The decision to abandon this type of property is a mistake, 
one that arises because of the unilateral nature of abandonment. If an owner were to propose a 
sale of such a resource, there would be no meeting of the minds as to a price. If the owner were 
to offer the resource to someone as a gift, the intended recipient could refuse to accept it. 
Abandoning such property may deprive the owner of the opportunity to get feedback from the 
market about the resource’s valuation, and it is that lack of information that causes the owner to 
make a transfer that leaves everyone worse off.  
With respect to positive subjective value, negative market value resources, then, there are 
two plausible legal approaches. First, the law might prohibit abandonment altogether. This is a 
sensible rule if it can be enforced at a low cost and if law enforcers can determine readily which 
properties are positive subjective value, negative market value resources. Second, the law might 
require a means of abandonment that will expose the owner to information about market 
valuations. The best way to do this in the case of chattels is to insist that the abandoning owner 
leave the chattel property at issue on a portion of her own real property adjoining a public 
way.167 If an owner sees that no one is taking the object in question, then she eventually will 
conclude that the market does not value the item as highly as she does, and she will reclaim it if 
it has not deteriorated.168 Keeping the item on her own real property also prevents third parties 
from having to shoulder unwanted disposal costs, and it subjects the abandoning owner to any 
reputational sanctions if the item in question is regarded as an eyesore. Ordinarily, when 
abandonment is proscribed or restricted, one should worry that individuals will destroy that 
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which cannot be abandoned. But it is difficult to imagine circumstances in which an owner 
would be motivated to destroy positive subjective value, negative market value property.169   
What of negative subjective value, negative market value resources? This category 
presents the strongest case for a prohibition rule. By abandoning this type of property, the 
resource’s owner imposes a negative externality on society. Assuming the property in question 
will not biodegrade quickly or will be an eyesore after abandonment, the law ought to compel the 
prior owner to bear the disposal costs. In addition to forcing an owner to internalize disposal 
externalities, a prohibition rule may promote the use of assets in sustainable ways, discourage 
aesthetic blight while an owner waits to see if anyone will claim the property, and encourage the 
development of a market for waste disposal firms that will benefit from specialization and 
economies of scale. Setting aside contexts where society wants to encourage individuals to 
explore taking ownership of risky resources that might have negative value, the best argument 
against a prohibitory rule will stem from enforcement costs. Abandoning negative subjective 
value, negative market value resources will always be tempting for the owner, and a local 
government may find it more cost effective to create a de facto escheat rule than to monitor and 
punish surreptitious dumping on public property. Essentially, then, a prohibition rule forces the 
owner to choose between two options: (1) unlawful self help, or (2) a market transaction where 
the owner will pay for disposal.   
Surveying the two categories of negative market value properties, then, we arrive at the 
conclusion that a prohibition regime works best for negative subjective value properties. For 
positive subjective value properties, prohibition and a safe harbor rule permitting abandonment 
on one’s own property appear to be the sensible alternatives. In theory, one might try to adopt a 
fine-grained legal rule whose dictates differed based on the subjective value of the property. In 
practice, however, a more complex doctrinal framework is not attractive because the act of 
abandonment suggests that property probably lacks subjective value to its owner, and subjective 
valuations of abandoned property will comprise private information that the state has a great deal 
of difficulty discovering. Assuming such a rule can be enforced with reasonable effectiveness, 
the law should prohibit the abandonment of negative market value resources. A rule of escheat, 
where the state takes possession of negative-market value resources at taxpayer expense would 
be justified only where baseline levels of law-abiding behavior are quite low or illegal dumping 
is particularly difficult to detect. 
B. Positive Market Value Property 
Positive market value properties present the most compelling case for a permissive rule 
regarding abandonment. The thorny question is whether the law should restrict abandonment so 
as to privilege other forms of property transfer, such as sales or gifts. As the analysis in Part II.C. 
                                                            
169 Pets may again present an exceptional case. There are cases where an individual contemplating imminent death 
seeks to destroy his animals because of a concern that they will not be well taken care of after his passing. See, e.g., 
In re Capers Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 121, 133 (Orphans’ Court 1964); In re Wishart, 46 E.T.R. 311, 129 N.B.R.2d 
397, 325 A.P.R. 397 (New Brunswick Queen’s Bench 1992) . 
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demonstrated, in order for policymakers to make an optimal decision about whether and when to 
permit the abandonment of a piece of positive market-value property they would need to know, 
at the very least, (a) the propensity of race participants to resort to illegal acts in order to capture 
that abandoned property, (b) the effects that the marginally increased prevalence of abandoned 
property would have on the propensity for finders to help reunify lost and mislaid property with 
its owners, (c) the likely time lag before someone will claim abandoned property, (d) the decay 
rate of the property in question, and (e) the magnitude of the transaction costs, decision costs, 
entertainment value, and warm glow associated with hypothetical bilateral transfers of the same 
property. To describe these as difficult empirical questions would be a vast understatement. They 
can be answered only through educated guesses. And whereas the property owner’s revealed 
preferences may expose some otherwise private information concerning factors (d) and (e), 
factors (a), (b), and (c) represent externalities that will have no bearing on the abandoning 
owner’s decision making. What is a common law court or an administrative agency in a licensing 
regime to do? 
The sensible legal response is one that seeks to control most of the negative externalities 
associated with the abandonment of positive market value property by supplementing the 
information that is available to members of the public. This can be done by encouraging an 
abandoning owner to (1) physically mark abandoned property as “abandoned” and (2) advertise 
the availability of property on one of the many free Internet forums that have sprung up to alert 
consumers as to the availability of “free stuff.” These measures will reduce, but not eliminate, 
confusion and lag time costs.170 Such behavior could be incentivized through tax policy, giving 
abandoned property of this sort some of the same tax advantages that property donated to charity 
presently receives. Alternatively, the law might regard property abandonment that does not 
comport with steps 1 and 2 as a misdemeanor, akin to littering, or it might enforce laws 
prohibiting the destruction of property in those cases. Owners wishing to rid themselves of 
property would still find that abandonment represents the lowest transaction cost option for 
doing so, especially if destruction is taken off the table.   
Permitting abandonment, provided that adequate publicity is given to the abandoned 
property, will mitigate all the negative externalities associated with abandonment save one: 
lawless race costs. If there is reason to believe that lawless races are likely, and will engender 
large social costs when they do occur, requiring that abandonment be publicized will entail more 
races, with more participants, resulting in more lawlessness. So what is the evidence on that 
score? No one keeps accurate statistics on the question of lawless races, so one needs to turn to 
data on behavior that may function as a proxy for propensity to engage in lawless races. Here, 
the data suggests that compared to the rest of the world, the United States has relatively high 
                                                            
170 When a British firm hired a nondescript gentleman to stand on a street corner wearing a sign saying “If you ask 
me for a 5 pound note you can have one,” only 28 out of 1800 passers by took him up on the offer. See Steven J. 
Dubner, There’s No Free Lunch, or Money, at <http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/29/theres-no-free-
lunch-or-money/> (visited October 14, 2008). This failure to claim the money is probably explained by skepticism 
that the offer was bona fide.  
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rates of property crimes,171 though a slightly lower rate than, say, Canada.172 Of course, scholars 
working on serious studies of cross-national crime statistics warn against relying on crime report 
data, because the methodologies for reporting and collecting such data vary so much across 
nations.173 Seen in relative terms, Americans might have a relatively high propensity to engage in 
lawless races, but it is unlikely that the social costs from marginally more races would trump the 
reduction in lag time, decay costs, confusion costs, and the greater warm glow associated with 
higher rates of utilization of abandoned property.  
What can be done about lawless races? Even if lawless races would be frequent and 
costly in a legal regime that publicized abandonment, those costs could be mitigated through 
legal doctrine. Perhaps that sentiment forms the basis for a sensible defense of escheat regimes in 
abandonment law. By permitting abandonment but criminalizing claims to abandoned property, 
the state mitigates the incentive to race, at least in theory. Once we account for the agency 
problems inherent in government management of common resources and the temptation for 
private actors to abscond with abandoned property before the state discovers its entitlement, 
however, the violent-race-reducing benefits of escheat likely dissipate.   
Property law offers a better avenue for curtailing lawless races. The law might both 
require publicity via Craigslist or one of the other information clearinghouses that have emerged, 
and provide the first person who puts in an online claim to receive a time-limited window during 
which only she could lawfully take possession of the abandoned asset. Put another way, after I 
announced that I was abandoning a dining room set, the first person to note in a linked follow-up 
posting on Craigslist that she was putting in a claim would get an exclusive two-hour window to 
take possession. If she failed to take possession within that timeframe, the dining room set would 
be up for grabs once again.174 In settings where the use of Craig’s List is impractical, with the 
Popov v. Hayashi home run ball dispute being the paradigmatic case, such a rule would give the 
first chance to catch the ball without interference to the fan in the best position to catch it. That 
                                                            
171 Jan van Dijk & Kristiina Kangaspunta, Piecing Together the Cross-National Crime Puzzle, Nat. Inst. Justice J., 
Jan 2000, at 39.  
172 Maire Gannon, Crime Comparisons Between Canada and the United States, 21 Statistics Canada no. 85-002, at 
6-7. 
173 Richard R. Bennett & P. Peter Basiotis, Structural Correlates of Juvenile Property Crime: A Cross-National, 
Time-Series Analysis, 28 J. Research Crime & Delinquency 262, 272 n.16 & 284 (1991). 
174 A colleague who has used craigslist to transfer property for free points out that no-show claimants impose a 
substantial cost on the would-be-donor, who often must wait around for the claimant who has promised to pick up 
the item. Ideally, the property owner would require the claimant to post a small bond to protect the owner against the 
costs of a no-show, but such a transaction effectively would convert the quasi-abandonment into a sale. An 
advantage of pure abandonment over quasi-abandonment is that the abandoning owner can avoid these no-show 
costs. An associated disadvantage is that true abandonment may discourage an item’s highest value user from trying 
to claim a valuable abandoned resource based on a fear that another claimant will take possession first. This analysis 
suggests that in quasi-abandonment situations, where a would-be-claimant detrimentally relies on an owner’s 
promise to hold an item until the would-be-claimant arrives, and the owner instead gives it to another claimant, 
liability for detrimental reliance under an estoppel theory would be appropriate. See supra note 79. 
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would have been Popov on the facts of the case.175 This proposed rule echoes the “reasonable 
prospect . . . of taking” the fox rule articulated by Judge Livingston in the canonical case of 
Pierson v. Post.176  Although a regime privileging first online or offline would-be claimants 
slightly increases lag time costs, it would substantially curtail lawless races, so such a doctrinal 
tweak would make sense in high violence environments. Alternatively, criminal law or tort law 
could help deter owners from abandoning property in ways that spark lawless races. Criminal 
liability for disturbance of the peace is one mechanism that law enforcement might use in cases 
where lawless races occur.177 An alternative approach would make abandoning owners liable if 
their act of abandonment sparked a foreseeable lawless race that resulted in injuries or littering 
qua looting.178 Any of these remedies, alone or used in combination, ought to bring down the 
lawless race costs associated with the abandonment of high value property.  
In underscoring the attractiveness of an abandonment doctrine that hinges on the market 
value of the property rather than its character as real property or chattels, a final consideration 
emerges: problems of proof. What if courts and other government bodies charged with enforcing 
the law are particularly bad at differentiating between positive and negative value property? In 
that case, it might make sense to prohibit abandonment generally, reasoning that positive market 
value properties are likely to be transferrable via gift or sale, and negative market value 
properties are not. So, at the end of the day, we will want to know how great these problems of 
proof are likely to be. My impression is that they are not particularly severe. In the case of real 
property, data on comparable sales is readily obtainable, as is data on liens encumbering the 
property. Where complexity arises, it will largely be because of the presence of easements on the 
property that diminish its value in ways that may be difficult to monetize. In the chattel property 
context, we ordinarily need not worry about easements and other servitudes.179 Unless chattel 
property is unique, calculating its market value—let alone determining whether that value is 
positive—should be a simple matter. In short, absent significant skepticism about the cognitive 
capacities of courts and other judicial decision makers, there is little reason to think that the 
inefficiencies associated with a prohibition on all abandonment are justified. 
C. Is Land Different? 
Recall the common law’s treatment of abandonment. The abandonment of chattel 
property is generally permitted, but the abandonment of corporeal interests in real property is 
flatly prohibited. The doctrine looks to the nature of the property rather than its value. It is worth 
asking whether there is anything about land that justifies its disparate treatment. 
                                                            
175 Popov v. Hayashi, 2002 WL 31833731, at *1. Popov’s attempt to claim the abandoned property would then give 
him title to the ball once either (a) he took certain control of it, or (b) a third party’s unlawful act impeded his ability 
to do so. 
176 3 Cai. R. 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. 1805) (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
177 See Allen, supra note 33, at C1. 
178 See supra note 61. 
179 See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 Geo. L.J. 885, 907-10 (2008) (describing the hostility 
of common law courts to the enforceability of personal property servitudes). 
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Land differs from chattel property in three relevant respects: (a) it is immobile, (b) it 
cannot be destroyed; and (c) a sophisticated recording system is already in place for land 
throughout the United States.180 Real property’s immobility eliminates the possibility that it will 
be lost or mislaid, which reduces the significance of confusion costs in the policymaking 
calculus. Real property’s indestructibility mitigates the damages associated with resource 
decay.181 The presence of a recording system means that there already exists, and long has 
existed, a low-tech version of Craigslist, which might function as an effective clearinghouse for 
information about abandoned real property, thereby reducing confusion and lag-time costs. In 
short, the unique attributes of land suggest that the problems created by abandonment are more 
significant in the context of chattels than they are in the context of real property. On this 
reasoning, the rule regarding the abandonment of real property should be at least as permissive as 
the rule regarding chattel property.  
Alas, there are two complicating factors. First, if abandoned real property has a higher 
propensity than abandoned chattel property to have negative value, then the common law rule 
might make more sense. Such property is unlikely to be claimed by well-informed third parties if 
abandoned, so permitting abandonment will not diminish the harms associated with lag time. 
Unfortunately, reliable data about the proportions of abandoned real and chattel property that 
have negative value is in short supply. One study suggests that 98% of all properties that are 
foreclosed on by New York City had negative value at the time of foreclosure, but this does not 
tell us whether the same is true of abandoned properties at the time of abandonment.182 If the 
98% figure holds for abandoned real property and the figure is much lower for abandoned 
chattels, then a plausible argument for the common law rule exists.  
Second, we must consider the relationship between adverse possession law and the law of 
abandonment. Like foreclosure, adverse possession may function as a substitute for 
abandonment, though it is an awkward one. The primary conceptual difference between 
abandonment and adverse possession stems from adverse possession’s requirement of non-
permissiveness. If the owner has intentionally relinquished title, then the trespasser’s presence on 
the land becomes permissive, precluding the possibility of adverse possession.183 What the 
thwarted abandoner therefore must do is either incur the transaction and decision costs associated 
                                                            
180 Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of Property, 13 J. Legal Stud. 299, 
309-10 (1984) (noting the first and third of these attributes). Baird and Jackson point out that some chattels, such as 
airplanes and automobiles, do have serial numbers that lend themselves to the creation of recording systems. 
181 Note that this is true for land but not for buildings or other improvements. Note further that because chattel 
property is destructible, the law conceivably could favor abandonment of chattels over abandonment of real property 
based on a fear that in the absence of an abandonment option owners of positive-value chattels will destroy the 
resource in question. I thank Jeremy Meisel for the latter observation. 
182 Scafidi et al., supra note 5, at 293, 297.  
183 St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Smith, 182 S.W.2d 945, 946-47 (Ark. 1945). The occasional sloppily reasoned case 
holds that the same facts give rise to both abandonment and adverse possession. See, e.g., Sackett v. O’Brien, 251 
N.Y.S.2d. 863, 868 (Supreme Ct. Monroe County1964)  This holding is incoherent because abandonment transfers 
title to the first claimant immediately. The Sackett holding would have been coherent had the court instead held that 
if the prior holder of the incorporeal interest in land did not lose it by abandonment, then subsequent events show it 
must have been lost by adverse possession. 
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with a sale or gift to a willing recipient, or engage in an elaborate kabuki dance with a faux 
adverse possessor, whereby the abandoner pretends that he objects to the “trespasser’s” entry. 
Such scenarios are not merely hypothetical; they are reflected in the case law.184 This latter 
approach will not be attractive to a real property owner, precisely because under adverse 
possession law it takes so long—typically six to ten years—for title to transfer.185 This lag 
creates a great deal of uncertainty for the would-be-transferor, who may see a trespasser work the 
land for five years, only to move elsewhere, likely requiring the would-be-transferor to start from 
scratch.   
Given that abandonment would be far more attractive than adverse possession to a land 
owner who wishes to lose his interest in land, what could possibly explain, why the law might 
prohibit the abandonment of land but permit its transfer via adverse possession? To put the point 
even more provocatively, we might ask why the law would favor consensual transfers of land 
masquerading as nonconsensual transfers over genuinely consensual transfers of land? There is 
no obvious answer to this question. The conventional response would be that adverse possession 
ensures that someone who values the property is using it at all times. But this response is 
deprived of its force once we recognize that (1) a rational trespasser will hesitate to improve the 
land any more than the law of adverse possession requires before title transfers at the end of the 
statute of limitations period, whereas a party that claims abandoned property will not hesitate to 
put property to its highest value use immediately; and (2) property doctrine can reduce the 
consequences of lag time by requiring that the owner advertise his act of abandonment. Indeed, 
the comparison between the very sensible law of chattel property—which makes transfer via 
adverse possession rather difficult186 and transfer via abandonment easy—and the law of real 
property—where the reverse is true—is puzzling.187  
Assuming that the real property that is abandoned is not overwhelmingly characterized by 
negative value, the common law rule embraced in Pocono Springs and numerous similar 
common law cases should be overruled.188 With respect to positive market value property, the 
                                                            
184 Something similar happened in Yourik v. Mallonee, 921 A.2d 869 (Md. App. 2007), where a divorcing couple 
abandoned real property, the parents of the husband took possession and began making tax and mortgage payments 
on it, and the prodigal son sued to quiet title decades later, asserting that he owned fee simple in the property, the 
mortgage of which had been paid off by the parents. The court held that the parents were the owners of the land, not 
by virtue of abandonment, but rather through adverse possession. Id. at 880 & n.6. Anson v. Tietze, 190 S.W.2d 193, 
197 (Mo. 1945), is another case where the court recognized the fact of the prior owner’s abandonment, but noted 
that adverse possession was the basis by which title was transferred. 
185 JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 115 (6th Ed. 2006). 
186 See O’Keefe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980) (holding that adverse possession of chattels should be 
displaced by the discovery rule, which dictates that the statute of limitations start running only when the true owner 
reasonably knows or should know the whereabouts of the property and the identity of its possessor); Guggenheim 
Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that the statute of limitations does not run until the true 
owner demands return of chattel property and a good faith purchaser refuses to hand it over). 
187 Note further the contrast to the law governing government-owned lands. Here too, abandonment is typically 
permitted and adverse possession is largely prohibited. See, e.g., McCauley v. Thompson-Nistler, 10 P.3d 794, 800-
01 (Mont. 2000). 
188 Perhaps, as Eduardo Peñalver has suggested to me, Pocono Springs could be defended on much narrower 
grounds than those embraced by the court. Namely, whatever the rule ought to be regarding the abandonment of 
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law should permit abandonment of corporeal interests, requiring only that the owner record a 
notice of abandonment, so that all parties interested in the land will learn of its availability, and 
that the successful claimant records his interest in the land, so third parties and government 
taxing authorities are informed of the title transfer. With respect to negative market value 
property, the same considerations relevant in the chattel context have enough force to warrant 
similar treatment for real and chattel property. An owner seeking to abandon land should be able 
to do so upon cleaning up or improving the property sufficiently to give it positive market 
value.189 An owner should not be forced to find a seller to take the property off his hands in order 
to be rid of it, in light of the substantial transaction costs associated with land sales.  
Conclusion 
 There has not been much sustained attention given to the issue of property’s 
abandonment. This paper suggests that this lack of attention may explain the generally lackluster 
content of abandonment law. Though most abandoned property probably has negative value, the 
abandonment of positive value chattel and real property appears to be rather common. In such 
instances, abandonment may be attractive as a means of relinquishing property that minimizes an 
owner’s transaction costs and decision costs. Abandonment may also serve other social 
objectives, such as facilitating generalized altruism, promoting desirable risk taking, enabling 
profit maximization via the sale of ancillary products, furthering individual autonomy, and 
encouraging the transfer of resources to higher value users. Prohibition rules, which assume that 
abandonment inevitably creates negative externalities, therefore usually miss the mark. More 
misguided still are laws that take as a given the social costs that the abandonment of positive 
value assets may engender—the waste and decay of unowned resources, confusion among third 
parties as to the state of title, and lawless races. These assumptions may have held true in a pre-
Internet era, but they no longer make sense in a world where Craigslist and freecycle are 
facilitating thousands of successful quasi-abandonment transactions every day. Where 
abandoned positive market value property can be identified clearly and potential claimants easily 
notified of its status, there is little good reason to prohibit this ancient means of transferring title.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
land, the law should restrict landowner’s ability to abandon obligations to pay homeowner’s associations dues 
required under the covenants, conditions, and restrictions of a common interest community. Even this narrower and 
more sensible approach might be inapt in a case like Pocono Springs, where the landowners evidently purchased 
their holdings under the mistaken impression that the land could be developed. It is scenarios like the one in Pocono 
Springs, where real estate becomes an inescapable money pit, that explained the common law courts’ historic refusal 
to let affirmative covenants bind successors in interest. See, e.g., Miller v. Clary, 103 N.E. 1114, 1117 (N.Y. 1913). 
The common law rule was rejected in the landmark case of Neponsit Property Owners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Emigrant 
Indus. Savings Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793, 797 (N.Y. 1938). 
189 If the landowner in question is the party that polluted it, abandoning the property would not relieve the polluter of 
the legal liabilities resulting from that pollution. See Baird, supra note 11, at 187-91. 
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